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Taxation and Corporation Finance
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the effects of the federal tax structure on
corporate financial and investment behavior. We first develop a model of
corporate behavior given taxes, taking into account both uncertainty and
costs of bankruptcy. Simpler. models abstracting from bankruptcy costs
had clear counter—factual implications. The forecasts from our model
proved to be consistent with both the observed cross—sectional variation
in debt—equity ratios and the time series pattern of debt—equity ratios
(data that were constructed in the paper).
We then attempted to measure the efficiency costs created by corporate
tax distortions as implied by the model. The forecasted efficiency cost
of the distortion favoring debt finance seemed to be quite large, while
the tax distortion affecting investment seemed to be less important than
others have claimed. The paper concludes with a study of the efficiency
implications of various proposed corporate tax changes.
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The analysis of the effect of the federal tax structureon
corporatefinancial policy is one of the most complex tasks in
the area of tax incidence and financial theory. The corporation
tax,several aspects of the personal income tax, the specific
provisions of the bankruptcy law and the costs involved in
financial reorganization must all be considered simultaneously.
Yet much of the early literature on the determination of
corporation financial structure, the early Modigliani-Miller
(1958, 1961) contribution being the key example, was developed
without consideration of taxes. Even the literature that does
allow for the effects of taxation has several drawbacks. For
one, many oftheimplicationsofthe models, such as the suggestion
in some models that debtequityratios will be increased without
limit, or the result that new equity will never be issued, are
clearly counterfactual. In addition, there has been little
effort either theoretically or empirically to measure the
efficiency costs of the effects of taxation on capital structure.2.
Stated starkly, in a world without taxation, corporate financial
policy is considered to be irrelevant, i.e. all policies are
equally efficient. Why then should the fact that taxation
makes a particular financial policy preferable be of any concern
to society?
in Section I of this paper, we first explore various models
of corporate financial policy with taxation. We find that,
unless we allow for both uncertainty and costs of bankruptcy,
the models have important counterfactual implications, which
undermines our confidence in other forecasts of these models.
We therefore use only the model allowing for uncertainty and
costs of bankruptcy in drawing inferences.
In Section II, we develop a time series for the aggregate
debt-equity ratio, then explore the consistency of the time
series and cross-sectional variation in debt-equity ratios with
the implications of the models. In Section III, we attempt to
estimate the magnitude of some of the efficiency costs and the
nature of the equity implications resulting from the existing
tax structure.
Finally, in Section IV, we analyze a variety of possible
changes in the tax s€ructure. In addition to describing how
these tax changes are likely to alter behavior, we also examine
the efficiency and equity implications of such changes.3.
I.
Though the purpose of this section isto analyze corporate
financial policy with taxation, itwill be useful first to review
the early development of thetheory without taxation. This will
provide a basis for comparison when taxesare introduced.
A. Capital structure in a no-taxworld
The classical articles on financialpolicy in this
context are by Modigliani and Miller(1958, 1961). while their
arguments have been clarified in later articles,1their basic
approach continues to be used.
Theirmain result is that, with no taxationand no
bankruptcy, corporate financial policy is irrelevant--thatis,
investorswill beindifferent ifthefirm proposes to alterits
debt-equity ratio or its dividend payoutrate, investment policy
held constant. Therefore, givenany investment policy, neither
dividend policy nor decisionsregarding capital structure affect
the value of the firm. inaddition, given that stocks are risky
while bonds are riskiess, risk willbe spread efficiently and,
under certain assumptions, investment willbe efficient.
The basic argument underlying theseconclusions is as
follows. Assume that the firm will receive dollars in return
on its investments after expenses eachperiod, where x is a
random variable. The firm has debt Don which it owes rD
1See,for example, Fama and Miller (1972),Hirshleifer (1970), and Stiglitz (1969, 1972, l971i.).1.
in interest payments each period. Stockholders therefore receive
x -rD(assuming all is paid out as dividends). However, suppose
stockholders have borrowed an amount B in order to purchase
their shares, in which case they owe rB in personal interest
payments. (The firm and the individual are assumed to face the
same interest rate, r .) Stockholdersas a group therefore
receive a net amount -rD-rBeach period.
Suppose the firm decided to decrease its debt—equity ratio
by selling stock, using the proceeds to retire D of debt. The
firm's stockholders have available the option of borrowing an
amount B =LDin order to buy the new issues of stocks.If
the stockholders employ this personal leverage, they will receive
eachperiod -r(D-D)-r(B+D)=x-rD-rB.(Note
that tD could equally well have been negative implying an
increase in the firm's debt-equity ratio. The stockholders
could offset this change by purchasing the bonds. )Theamount
the stockholders receive is identical to what they would have
received prior to the change. Stockholders can completely undo
the effects of any action by the firm to change its debt-equity
ratio and so would find the change irrelevant. Since personal
borrowing is a perfect substitute for corporate borrowing, the
firm cannot profit from additional leverage and since individuals
can undo any degree of corporate leverage by buying bonds and
shares of the levered company, the firm would not be hurt by a7.
capital structure that is more levered than investors desire.
In fact, not only is any one firmts financial policyirrelevant,
but so is the aggregate financial policy of thecorporate sector.
While we have so far assumed that the entire net return to
the firm is paid out as dividends, the same type ofargument
as used above will show that the dividend payout rate is also
irrelevant. For suppose that the firm chooses to retain some
additional portion of its earnings. Given the firm Ts investment
policy, this change implies that the additional retentions will
be used to retire securities (or to sell fewer additional
securities on the open market to finance its investment program).
Suppose the retentions are used to repurchase debt D.The
stockholders can then increase their borrowing by D, thereby
obtaining funds which will exactly offset the loss in dividends,
while leaving themselves with the same cash flow in future
periods as they would have had prior to the change. These kinds
of individual transactions can be employed to offset payout
changes rendering dividend policy irrelevant as well.2
What are the implications for the efficiency of risk bearing
and of real investment? Diamond (1967) shows that when individuals
can bear part of the risk in the return from a firm only by bearing
2Alternatively, when the firm cuts its dividends, it could
issue fewer new shares E. Shareholders can then offset the
lost dividends by selling E of their own shares and yet retain
the same percent ownership in the firm as they would have had
without the change in policy by the firm. The argument here does
not depend on no bankruptcy, since the debt-equity ratio remains
unchanged.6.
some proportionate share of the firm's profits, a competitive
stock market will spread these risks efficiently across investors
(assuming no binding constraints on short sales). Thinking
of risk as a commodity (a lottery), efficient risk spreading
would exist if at the margin each investor demanded the same
risk premium to absorb an additional unit of risk. A fully
competitive market would achieve this result since all individuals
buy lottery tickets until the market price just compensates them
for absorbing an additional unit of risk, thereby equating risk
premiums across investors. Diamond (1967) also shows that under
certain reasonable assumptions regarding competitive securities
markets (which rule out any degree of market power for a firm
in the securities market), real investment will also be efficient.
The above arguments on the irrelevance of corporate
financial policy, include a number of implicit assumptions. The
key one is that there is neither bankruptcy of the firm nor of
the individual. Under this assumption, it follows naturally
that everyone faces the same interest rate, independent of
amount borrowed. What happens, however, if bankruptcy is
introduced but is assumed neither to entail any cost when ownership
is transferred to bondholders nor to create any moral hazard
problems?
As long as the firm's debt and equity have perfect
substitutes among combinations of the other available securities,7.
for any choice of financial policyby the firm, the firm's
financial policy would still be irrelevant. Sinceany
Subdivision by the firm of its total random return intotwo
securities (debt and equity) is already availableto investors
through combinations of alternative securities, and since the
sum of the prices on these two securities mustby competition
equal the price of that proportional share in the firm, the
firm could not gain by changing its financial policy.3
Under what assumptions would the firmTs debt andequity
have perfect substitutes among combinations of theother
available securities? Those assumptions yielding thesimple form
of the capital asset pricing model would be sufficient.Here
a traded security is characterized completely by its covariance
Note that no
with the return on the market as a whole./changein a firm's
financial policy, given its investment policy, will affect the
marJcet return, as long as bankruptcy is costless. Therefore the
f i rm
value of a /willdepend only on its expected return and the
covariance of this return with the market, and noton how this
return is divided between debt and equity. Other conditions
sufficient to imply irrelevance of the firm's financialpolicy
are (1) the existence of complete contingent commodity markets
3Iuerbach and King (1979),however, deal with a simple
case involving one firm, two investors, and two states of the
world, where even costless bankruptcy could lead to an optimal
capital structure. Their case involves changes in the pattern
of returns across states of nature that, in effect, change the
set of available securities in a nontrivialway and so directly
affect the utility of investors.8.
(seeStiglitz (1969)), and (2) the existence of financial
intermediaries willing to repackage without cost the financial
structure of the firm whenever it might be profitable.
To the degree that any of these sets of assumptions are
feltto be realistic, corporate financial policy is irrelevant
as long as bankruptcy is costless and there are no taxes. But
thereare many reasons why bankruptcy is costly. First, the
processof bankruptcy itself entails significant administrative
expenses for lawyers, accountants, appraisers, etc. We explore
themagnitude of these costsin Section III. The bankruptcy
processalso creates uncertainty for security holders,inaddition
tothe basic uncertainty in the return on the real investments.
The courts have not consistently followed legal priorities in
determining settlements, and legal costs themselves are uncertain.
Given the uncertain interpretation of the law, any group of
security holders might bring suit claiming that they have received
an insufficient share. We shall also see below that informal
reorganizations, while less costly in total than bankruptcy,
may be difficult or impossible to arrange.
Bondholders may also push for liquidation over reorganization,
evenwhen this is inefficient.First, there is
lessroom for the courts to deviate from the absolute priority
under
of bond holders under liquidation. Also, /liquidation, bondholders
could receive up to the par value of their bonds even if the
market value of the bonds had fallen substantially due to a
Sinceby assumption a financial intermediary can create
any securities that the firm can create, they can provide the
perfect substitutes. See also Stiglitz (1971i).9.
generalrise in interest rates.
in addition, the very possibility ofbankruptcy creates
opportunities for the firm's managers, acting in the interests
of stockholders, to aid stockholders at theexpense of existing
bondholders through inefficient financial policy and investments.
For exaliple, suppose the firm were to issue new debt withequal
priority in bankruptcy to old debt, using the proceeds to
undertake new investment or to repurchase stock. Theprevious
debt holders would suddenly own a riskierasset, yet the interest
rate charged could not adjust to reflect that increased risk.
By issuing debt in separate issues rather than all atonce,
thefirm may receive more favorable overall terms.Similarly,
if the firm undertakes a new risky investment,implying a higher
probability of bankruptcy, existing bondholders are worse off,
yetagain the interest rate on their securities cannot readjust.5
Conversely, new safe investments may lower the probability of
bankruptcy, aiding existing bondholders. The previous arguments
about the irrelevance of the debt-equity ratio and the efficiency
of investment assumed that bondholders charged the interest rate
appropriate for the risk they absorbed, while we have seen in
our example, that the firm might subsequently be able to change
the amount of risk they absorb. Investment incentives are
therefore distorted.
5Bondholders will attempt toprevent such actions through
covenants in the initial contract. However, their ability to
prevent these actions is limited.
6For further discussion ofthese moral hazard problems in
debt contracts, see Myers (1977) or Jensen and Meckling (1976).10.
Bondholders are not quite so vulnerable, of course. They
may attempt to anticipate these actions by the firm and will
charge an appropriate interest rate. Investment would still
be inefficient, however, implying that the gains to stockholders
from the investment are more than offset by the higher interest
costs.HowLver, in order to obta in lower interest costs,the
firm would have to guarantee to bondholders initially through
indentureprovisions in the bond contract that it will not engage
in such activities that cause harm to existing bondholders.
There will likely be not insubstantial negotiation and monitoring
costs involved in such guarantees, and it is most unlikely that
the provisions will be foolproof. It is probably impossible to
avoid the moral hazard issue completely unless the firm does not
issue risky debt.
Ignoring bankruptcy costs and taxes, a firm'Sfinancial
policywould be irrelevant. However, with bankruptcy costs
but no taxes, risky debt entails costs but no compensating benefit.
Weconclude, therefore, that without taxes the firm would finance
itself almost entirely by equity7--whatever debt is issued will
TSuch a strategy will also give the firm the most flexibility
in acquiring new funds as has been suggested by Myers (l97'().
Nevertheless, several other considerations have been suggested
in the literature which should lead firms to choose more debt:
(1) lower underwriting and selling, fees for debt than equity
issues (Baumol and Malkiel, 1967); (2) the use of the amount of
debt as a signal to investors of the management's expectations
about bankruptcy risk (Ross, 1977); (3) moral hazard or agency
costs involved with public equity issues on a par with those
discussed above with debt issues (Jensen and Meckling, 1976);
(Ii.)moralhazard costs in the individual debt substituted for firm
debt. (The individual can provide collateral other than the firm's
equity, however, so individual borrowing may dominate borrowing
by the firm.); and ()thegreater flexibility of debt to meet
seasonal and other short-term needs for funds.11.
be essentially riskless.Therefore, bankruptcy costs will be
effectively zero. The dividend payout ratewould be viewed
as irrelevant, or if individuals havepreferences between
dividends and capital gains, the firmwould have the incentive
to take them into account.8 Giventhe zero probability of
bankruptcy and the use only of a stock market inspreading risk,
the risk from the investment willbe spread efficientlyamong
investors and, subject to certainqualifications, investment
incentives will be efficient.
B. Introduction of taxes
When considering the effects of taxeson the firm's
financial structure, we must consider indetail at least the
corporation tax and the personal income tax. Thecorporation
tax by itself provides astrong incentive in favor of debt
finance as interest paymentsare deductible from operating
earnings before income taxes are imposed, whilea tax rate T
must be paid on the residual ownedby the shareholders. However,
under the personal income tax, interest incomeis taxed at a
marginal rate m .Whiledividends are also taxed at this rate,9
8Whentransactionscosts are taken into account, for
example, the payout rate will be of concern to both investors
andissuers. Individuals who need touse the returns from their investments for consumption will be ableto avoid the substantial brokeragecharges involved in selling off small pieces of their
security holdings if they receive dividends.Alternatively, they will prefer retention by the firm ifthey would choose to reinvest their returnsanyway. Similarly, by retention, the firm would avoid the underwriting andselling fees involved in
new issues. One might therefore expectconsumers to prefer firms
with little need for funds and reinvestorsto prefer firms with
greater needs for funds.
9Thjs is notnecessarily the case. For example, acertain minimum amount of dividendsmay be excluded entirely from taxable income. Moreover, corporate shareholdersare able €o exclude 85percent ofdividend receipts from taxable income.12.
capital gains are taxed at a lower effective rate, c, which is
lower than m because a) 60 percent of long-term capital gains
are excluded from taxable income; b) the tax is due (without
interest penalty) only when the asset is sold or perhaps not
at all if it is part of a bequest; and c) the individual can
selectively realize capital losses sooner than capital gains.
Therefore, the personal tax alone favors equity finance.
Whether the total tax system favors the use of debt or equity
finance will depend on a balancing of the advantages under one
tax with the disadvantages under the other. At the end of the text
a glossary of symbols is included to aid the reader in following the
development of the model.
1. No uncertainty, no bankruptcy
Let us first examine this problem in the idealized
setting where there is neither uncertainty nor bankruptcy.
The model used basically is a formalization of Miller!s (1977)
arguments, though it borrows also from King (l97)#) and Stiglitz
(1973).Most of the existing literature is developedin this
context. Can we rationalize the existence of both debt and
equity in this context?
Let us first develop optimal investment rules for the
firm.The first result is that the firm will continue to invest
until the pretax marginal return on its investments (after
covering depreciation and expenses) denoted by s, has been reduced
to the market interest rate, r. Repurchase of debt and new real
investment are alternative uses of funds, so ought to earn the
same net rate of return at the margin after tax. Both alternatives13.
receive the same tax treatment(assuming economic depreciation
in the tax law and no investmenttax credit). The net returns
from investment are taxed atregular corporate rates. The net
reduction in cash outflow frompurchasing debt is taxed at the
same rate since deductions from taxable incomeare lowered.
Thus, both alternatives must have thesame rate of return before
tax as well. Note that unincorporated businesseswill also
invest until the marginal returnon their investment equals the
market interest rate, for similarreasons. This implies that
in spite of the corporate income tax(ignoring explicit investment
incentives), investment earns the same pretaxmarginal rate of
return in both corporate andnoncorporate uses, contrary to the
assumption in Harberger (197k). However, because ofthe personal
income tax, individuals invest untilr(l-m) is their marginal time
preference rate. We therefore conclude thateven though the
investment that occurs is allocatedefficiently, an inefficient
amount of investment occurs as a result of thedistortions in
the personal income tax.1°
Let us now examinethe firm'soptimal decision rule for
investmentsfinancedwith equity. The firm should financenew
investmentthrough new issues of equity until the stock market
valuesthe returns to a dollar of marginal real investmentat
10Were we to take intoaccount the investment tax
credit and accelerated depreciation,however, investment is
also allocated inefficiently (see Bradford (1978)).l4.
just a dollar. This result is analogous to Tobin's q theory of
investment, as developed in Tobin (1969), Ciccolo (1975), and
11
von Furstenberg (1977).
Could the stock market consistent value a dollar of
real investment at less than a dollar in this context of no
uncertainty and no bankruptcy? Certainly there would be no new
equity issues in such a case. However, in addition, the firm
would find it profitable to borrow further, using the funds to
repurchase equity. For if the firm were to borrow an additional
dollar, it would owe r more in interest payments each period.
Assume it repurchases q dollars of equity, where q is the
value in the stock market of the returns to a dollar of the
marginal real investment. The repurchase, by freeing the
returns to a dollar real investment, allows the firm to just
cover its additional interest payments, a result implied by optimal
debt finance of investment. But since q <1,the firm is left
with 1-q >0in profits. Equity would therefore continue to
be repurchased until q =1or until there
is no more equity outstanding.
Ifrepurchase of equityis forbidden (or very costly),
however,then as long as q <1,the firm will issue no new
equity, but existing equity will remain. The amount of equity
that will remain is a historical accident.In fact, repurchase
11Inthesepapers, q is the ratio of the total market value
ofthe firm (debt and equity) to the replacement cost of the firm's
capital stock (ignoring obsolescence). Here, q is the ratio of
the value in the stock market of a marginal investment divided
by its purchase cost. Though one advantage of the first definition
of q is that it is easier to measure, Gordon and Bradford (1979)
estimate a time series forq as defined in this paper.17.
of equity is illegal in Great Britain.In the United States
although repurchases are not illegal assuch, complications can
arise. For example, one clearproblem is that if repurchases
are done so as precisely to imitate dividendpayments (periodic
percentage repurchases from each shareholder) then thepayments
will be taxed as dividends.12 Bradford(1977), Auerbach (1979),
and Stiglitz (1973) explore models whereq < 1 due to a constraint
preventing repurchase of equity. Any existingequity is left
over from the period prior to the imposition of thecorporation
tax (when, as we argued above, equity financewould have been
favored) or from the initial equity established inorder for the
firm to incorporate. These models all havethe counterfactual
implication, however, that no new equity will be issued.
Sinceit is difficult to maintain thatcorporations, even
after forty years, would not have takenadvantage of these
arbitrage profits, and since new issues of equity dooccur, we
willhenceforth assume that the debt-equity ratio does not deviate
systematically from its equilibrium value. Optimal firm behavior
then tells us that in equilibrium 1) s=r fromoptimal debt
finance and 2) q=1 from optimal equity finance. (Wereq to
be > 1, the firm would continue to sell newequity to undertake
real investment until q=1.)
Let us now look at optimal portfolio behavior ofinvestors,
assuming that firms satisfy these two equilibrium conditions.
12Anotherproblem, in principle, is prosecution for
trading on inside information.16.
In exploring this problem let us assume that the firm pays out
as dividends p percent of its after tax profits and reinvests
the rest. Also assume that the investor with a marginal tax
rate of m on interest payments has a marginal tax rate of n
on dividends1 and an effective tax rate of c on capital gains.
When investing a dollar in bonds, the investor receives
r(l-m) =s(1-m)each period. When investing a dollar in equity,
the investor receives as dividends ps(1_T)(l_n) after tax.
The firm has also reinvested (1_p)s(1_T) per dollar of real
investment, implying a capital gain to the shareholder of
(1p)s(1T)(1_c) after personal income tax. Assuming that the
investor must buy only non-negative quantities of either asset,
he will invest in that asset giving the higher rate of return,
and only in that asset. He will be indifferent between the
two assets only if
(1.1) r(1-m) =s(l-m)=ps(l_T)(1_n)+(1_p)s(1_T)(l_c)
Let us explore this indifference condition further.
Miller (1977) effectively assumed here that p =0and c =0;
although n =0and c =0would be equivalent. These imply that
13Corporate holders of securities, for example, pay a full
corporate tax rate on interest receipts but,as noted, above are
able to exclude from taxable income 85 percent of dividend receipts.
1Ifthe individual can purchase negative quantities of either asset, then he will find itprofitableto sell the less
desirableasset and to invest the proceeds in the other asset.
He will continue to do this indefinitely or until his tax rates
have evolved to the point where he is then indifferent between
the two assets.17.
the investor is indifferentbetween bonds and equity if and
only if rn =T If m < T he will investonly in bonds, if
m > T only in equity. The equilibriumdebt-equity ratio there-
fore depends on theprogressivity of the personal income tax
and the distribution of wealthacross tax brackets. Since
T =.-6now, whereas the maximum federal marginal tax rate is
7O many individuals could welloptimally be investing in equity
in this context. Since,by assumption, returns to equity come
aftercorporate taxes but then are free of tax, returnsfrom
bonds are inferior for all holderswith tax rates above the
corporatetax rate despite the fact that returnsto bondholders
are not subject to corporate taxes.
When all investors have purchased theirpreferred security,
the marginal investor (for whomm =T)willjust be indifferent
between receiving the returns froma given real investment
throughdebt or through equity. While returns toequity come
after the payment of corporate incometaxes, those returns will
not be taxed again. On the otherhand, bond returns, while not
subject to corporate income taxes, will besubject to personal
income taxes at the same rate. The firmwill therefore be
indifferent to how it finances that givenreal investment.
In fact, assuxriing that the firm is smallrelative to the market
so that the firm cannot affect the characteristicsof the
marginal security holder, it will find irrelevantany change in18.
itsfinancial policy, large or small. The Modigliani-Miller
conclusions are thus maintained at the firm level. However,
as noted above, the aggregate debt-equity ratio is determinant,
depending on the distribution of wealth across tax brackets.
How realistic are Millerts assumptions? In particular,
is the marginal individual tax rate on the returns to equity
effectively zero? Since taxes on capital gains are paid only
at realization (with no interest penalty for the postponement),
or not at all if the share is still owned when the investor
dies, c will certainly be very small for many investors.
However, empirically the payout ratio p is approximately •55)5
Therefore,the individual tax rate on equity is zero only as
long as n =0.Dueto the exclusion of 2OO in dividends from
taxable income for married couples, for small investors n =0,
but almost surely in addition m <Tfor those. investors, so
none will own equity. Similarly, tax free investors will have
n =0but also m =0<T,implying that bonds are preferable
to equity. Miller and Scholes (1978) point out that for very
large investors extra dividends may enable the investor to
increase his interest deduction so as just to offsetany tax
due, implying also that n =0.Forthere to be a binding
restrictionon interest deductions, however, the investor must
1This is theaverage figure in the National Income and
ProductAccounts for 1970-75.19.
be deducting well overp25,000 in interest.16According to
the Treasury's file,a representative cross-sectionof
individual tax forms,only .02% of tax payers who received
dividends appeared to facea binding constraint on interest
deductions.17Therefore, for almost all individualinvestors
potentially interested in equity in thiscontext, we expect
n =m,the tax rate on dividend and interestincome is the
same.
If n =m,at what value of m willan investor now be
indifferent between debt andequity? We have indicated that
c .2rn,
p .55. Suppose/ as would be the case with a 60percent
exclusion and assuming postponementof the tax until realization
halves the effective rate.Investors will then be indifferent
when m.70. With reasonable values for theparameters,
essentially no individual investors willown equity. To reinforce
this implication of themodel, let us introduce tax free debt
earning an interest raterf .Wepresent evidence in Appendix A
that rf has beenapproximately equal to .75r.18 Thus, the
1975, the maximum deduction allowedwas 25,0O0 plus dividends plus interest income andother investment income
(realized capital gainsplus items on Schedule E).
1wewouldlike to thank Dan Frisch fordoing these calculations for us.
18The modelwould imply that if (1-rn) <.75,the individual
would borrow deducting the interestpayments from taxable income in order to invest in tax freebonds. However, the IRS would
disallow the interest deduction in thissetting eliminating such incentives. Ourimplicitestimate of m.25 is consistent with
McCulloch (1975) who estimated themarginal tax rate of holders
of long-term government bonds to bebetween .22 and .30.20.
maximumtax rate thatindividuals have to payon interest
m(r-rf)/rf =.25.
receipts is just 25 percent;/While under Miller's assumptions,
only individuals with m T=.146will prefer equity to bonds,
we find that no one will face this high a marginal tax rate.
We conclude that nobody will own equity.
Thus,when the relative rates of return on debt and equity
are such that firms are indifferent between debt and equity
finance,essentially all individual investors will prefer owning
debt to equity--the equilibrium financial structure in this
context will involve only debt. This conclusion is dramatically
counterfactual. Thus, in a world of certainty and taxes, it
doesnot seem possible to explain an equilibrium financial
structure with both debt and equity. An analysis ignoring
uncertainty is clearly unsatisfactory.
2. Uncertainty, no bankruptcy
Given these counterfactual implications of the model
withoutuncertainty, let us explore whether we will obtain
more realistic conclusions if we allow for uncertainty but not
bankruptcy, so that bonds are riskiess securities (ignoring
inflation risk). This is the setting used by Modigliani-Miller
(1958).However,we continue to allow for both corporate and
personal taxes.
As before, let us first look at the firm's incentives to
finance investment through debt issues. Now, at the margin the
expected return on a dollar investment must be sufficiently
above the market interest rate so as just to compensate shareholders21.
for the extra uncertainty whichthey bear as a result of the
investment. We may thenexpress the required expected rate of
return, s, on the marginal dollar investmentas s =r+pwhere
p is the risk premium demanded by
shareholders, before corporate
tax, in compensation for bearing the extrarisk. As before, the
firm would be indifferent tofinancing additional investmentby
issuing new equity when the stock marketvalues the returns from
a dollar of real investment at a dollar.We can also show as
before that if the stock marketconsistently values the returns
from a dollar of real investment atless than a dollar, then the
firm can borrow to repurchaseequity and make arbitrage profits.
With these two results, wecan show that there still will
be an incentive to increase thedebt-equity ratio without limit.
of
The return on a dollar/real investmentbefore corporate tax can
be represented by S =r+p+ Here represents the random
element, with mean zero, in the returnon the investment.
Optimal debt finance implies thatequity holders will be
indifferent to the last dollar ofdebt-financed real investment,
so will be just willing to accept the residuals-r which has
expected return p in compensation for alsoaccepting the stochastic
return Optimalequity finance implies that equity holders
will be willing topay a dollar for the returns on a dollar
real investment, so they willpay a dollar for an expected return
r-I-p along with a stochastic return€, all prior to the corporate
tax. Combining the two results,equity holders must be willing22.
to pay one dollar to receive a nonstochastic return r .However,
we found in the previous section that when the alternative
investments are riskiess taxable bonds also earning r and tax
free bonds earning rf.75r that no individual would invest a
dollar in equity to earn a nonstochastic before corporate tax
rate of return r.19 As long as debt remains riskiess, the firm
will always have an incentive to increase the debt-equity ratio
without limit. The model, allowing for uncertainty but not
bankruptcy, still has dramatically counterfactual implications.
3. Uncertainty with bankruptcy
Let us now allow for the possibility of bankruptcy in the
model. What if bankruptcy is costless? We showed in Section l.A
with costless bankruptcy and without taxes that the debt-equity
ratiowould be irrelevant. With taxes, however, all investors
would pay less taxes through owning debt, so firms would desire
to increase their debt-equity ratios without limit.20 Since
weknow that firms (and their lenders) do tend to limit the
extentof financial leverage, itwould appear that bankruptcy
19Withequity, the after tax return is at best r(l_T) =
whiletax free debt earns .75r.
20The IRScouldthreaten to reclassify debt as equity for
taxpurposes were debt finance used almost exclusively. This
threat would create an incentive to maintain enough equity to forestall the danger. Itis doubtful, however, that one can
relyon this explanation for the existence of the amount of
equityactually in existence.23.
is sufficiently costly to affect the value of the firm materially.
One problem that must be faced if bankruptcy is costly,
however, is why the market does not find some device to avoid
such costs. Presumably, avoiding these bankruptcy costs is in
the best interests of the various claimants on the firm in
aggregate. However, there are several reasons why bankruptcies
may occur in spite of the cost. Negotiation with the full set
of investors is both difficult and very costly—-especially
when public bondholders exist. Bankruptcy costs arise in large
part precisely because of these difficulties.
While the availability of alternatives to formal bankruptcy
puts some upper bound on the costs of bankruptcy (as argued by
Haugen and Senbet (1978)), these alternatives are themselves
costly. Costs are not avoided by informal reorganization for
the essential problem remains of negotiating acomplicated
settlement among parties with different interests and alternative
legal remedies. Indeed the problems are sometimes so complex
that informal reorganizations without bankruptcy is either
impossible to achieve or can be arranged only with costs as
large as those incurred with formally bankruptcy. We show in
Section II that this is especially true if there are many classes
of security holders all of whom must agree to a reorganization
plan and all of whom may take recourse in litigation if they
subsequently feel they were treated unfairly.2.
There is also a potential problem of externalities.
When any reduced coalition of investors considers preventing
the firm from going bankrupt, it must ignore the resulting benefits
or costs accr'uing to the remaining investors. But the smaller
the coalition, the larger this externality. The benefits of
avoiding bankruptcy for the reduced coalition may not be as
large as the costs of keeping the firm out of bankruptcy even
if the benefits to the investors as a whole are large enough.
Bulow and Shoven (1978) and White (1979) give examples of this,
where a coalition of bank lenders and equity holders would choose
to force bankruptcy in spite of the costs, at the expense of the
public bondholders.
Another inducement to bankruptcy is that as the size of
debt increases relative to the value of the firm, the management
acting in the interest of stockholders will find more inefficient
investments becoming profitable as they ignore any costs born by,
bondholders or bank lenders resulting from an increase in the
probability of bankruptcy. Bondholders, unable to prevent such
actions may well stop the erosion in the value of their securities
by forcing the firm into bankruptcy at their first chance,
in spite of the transaction costs of bankruptcy.
Finally, formal bankruptcy may be the only way a firm in
distress can obtain new financing. This is so because new loans
to the bankrupt estate receive an enforceable first lien on the
assets of the estate while new loans to a reorganized company
cannot receive the same degree of protection.25.
How, then, ought these bankruptcy costs to be modelled
when studying the firm's debt-equity decision? Thecovenant's
with existing bondholders wouldnormally require that any
further debt issued be junior in priority inbankruptcy to the
existing debt, unless certain earnings coverage andliquidity
ratios are met, in which case bankruptcy ishighly unlikely,
at least over the near term. When considering additionaldebt,
the stockholders and the potentially most junior debt holder
form a coalition. Only possible bankruptcy costs bornby this
coalition will be considered in the decision to increase the
debt of the firm. These costs will depend mainly on theexisting
debt-equity ratio (positively) and the variability of both prior
and additional earnings or cash flow (giving together thechange
in the probability of threatened default), though the form of
the dependence will vary by firm. Only part of the total costs
of bankruptcy will be born by this coalition, however, with the
fraction depending on the priority rules in bankruptcy and the
circumstances under which bankruptcy would occur.21 As we shall
see below, "me first" rules are often not honored in bankruptcy
reorganizations.
In analyzing the effects of uncertainty and possible
costly bankruptcy on the firm's financial decision, we assume
21To the degree thatpart of the costs created by a higher
debt-equity ratio are ignored in financing decisions, since they
are born by existing bondholders, these decisions will be inefficient.
Increasing thefraction of bankruptcy costs born by this coalition
would therefore improve the efficiency of investment and financial
decisions, and revisions in the legal structure of bankruptcy
oughtto aim towards this.26.
that the firm sells its securities on a market satisfying the
assumptions of the capital asset pricing model. Brennan (1970)
and Gordon-Bradford (1979) show that when the capital asset
pricing model is applied in a world with personal taxes, all





Here, g1 is the part of the expected return on the i'th
security which is given capital gains treatment, di is the
part of the expected return taxed at ordinary rates, and r
the
is the return, also taxed at ordinary rates, on/riskless asset.
The subscript M refers to the market index, and measures the
(systematic) riskiness of the i'th security. In the derivation,
it is shown that a is a weighted average across investors of
the relative value of a dollar of dividends to each investor
2 also
compared with that of a dollar of capital gains.3 a is/the same
for all firms. The equation says that the equilibrium risk
premium on any asset (the left hand side of 3.1) compensates
just for the component of that asset's risk (measured by )
thatmoves with the market as a whole--any other component can
be diversified away and merits no risk-premium.
22The derivation assumes thatonly g and are
stochastic.
23Whenonlytaxes affect the relative values of capital
gains and dividends, an investor's relative value of dividends
would equal .Whenmn for all investors, however, the
weight ab on bond interest payments will differ from the
weighta on dividend receipts.27.
Pt the equilibrium debt-equity ratiofor the firm, both
the debt and the equity issuedby the firm must satisfy the
capital asset pricing equation, and the firmmust find issuing
debt or equity to be equally profitable atthe margin.In
addition, when investment is optimal as well, investorsmust be
willing to pay a dollar to receive the returns froma one
dollar marginal investment, whether thefinancing was from debt
or from equity. What implications do these equilibrium conditions
have?
Let us explore first the relativeprofitability of debt
and equity finance when the probability or costs ofbankruptcy
are not affected by the choice.2 Even for thiscase there are
two new complications which must be addressed.First, when
considering debt vs. equity finance, though total bankruptcy
costs are assumed to be unchanged, the fraction of thereceipts
in bankruptcy going to the coalition ofequity holders and the
possible new bondholder may be affected by the financing decision.
However, if the new debt is, in fact, junior in priority to all
existing debt, as new equity would be, thismay not occur.
Second, even if the amount of uncertainty born by the coalition
is the same whether debt or equity finance isused, the risk
premium demanded for the given risk may be affected by the
financing decision. However, because of the implicit assumption
in the Gordon-Bradford model that all stochastic returnsare
setting is essentially the same as that used in the
previous section, and we will show that the conclusions remain
unchanged when we use the capital asset pricing model.28.
taxed at the capital gains rate, the capital asset pricing
model implies that the total risk premium (the right side of
equation 3.1) required to compensate investors for bearing all
the risk depends only on the covariance of the uncertainty with
the market uncertainty, and not on how the uncertainty is split
between bondholders and equity holders.
Since the total risk born by the coalition, and the price
demanded for bearing that risk, is unaffected by the financing
decision, we need only look at the risk premium received (the
left side of equation 3.1) in order to decide whether the firm
will find debt or equity finance more profitable.1½s long as
the risk premiums received are equal under either debt or equity
finance of a given investment, the market will value the returns
independently of the form of finance, implying that the firm is
also indifferent to the form of finance.It can be shown that
the risk premiums will be equal in this context when:25
(3.2) abr =(1_p)r(1_T)+apr(1_T)
This comparison is equivalent to that in equation (1.1) assuming
25When a dollar of investment is financed by equity, the
expected receipts to the firm after corporate tax (including
expected bankruptcy costs) are s(l_T). With p still representing
the percent paid out as dividends, the risk premium received,
as valued in the market (the left hand side of equation 3.1) is:
EV(s) =(1_p)s(l_T)+ap(1_T)
-ar
where EV(s) represents the expected return to equity over the
risk free rate resulting from before tax return .Whenthesame
investment is financed by debt, the expected after tax receipts
to the firm are r +(.r)(1_T).Were there zero expected capital
gains on bonds, then when bond finance is used, bondholders would
receive an expected risk premium abr_ar =BV(r),the expected
value to bondholders of the return r, over the risk free rate,
while equity holders would receive the rest, increasing the risk29.
1-n 1-rn a = andab = , implyingthat investors prefer bonds
except when ab is extraordinarily smaii.26 But of course this
should be the case since we have so far ignoredany effect of
the financing decision on the probability of bankruptcy so the
situation is basically that of the last section.
However, a decision to finance an extra dollar with debt
instead, of equity will increase the probability of bankruptcy,
and increase the moral hazard associated with risky debt,
described in section 1. These increased costs will be split
between the existing bondholders and the equity holders (perhaps
along with a coalition of the new junior bondholders).27
The component of the costs that will be borne by the existing
bondholders will be ignored by the coalition deciding whether to
(footnote 27 continued) —
premiumthey receive by EV(s-r) +ar.Whencomparing the
expected value to investors of the rturn to_the firm using
equity vs. debt finance, we then compare EV(s) with BV(r) + —
EV(s-r)+ar.Ifthey are equivalent, then BV(r) +ar=EV(s)-
EV(s-r)=EVr)+arorabr= (1-p)r(lT) +apr(1_T). Z
26Thederivation of 3.1 assumed n=rn and ignored the
existence of tax free bonds. When n,Lrn, the weight a on interest
receipts would differ (and presumably be smaller) th'n the a
weight on dividends.
27To the extent that public equity also has moral hazard
or agency costs, as described in Jensen and Meckling (1976),
then the increased costs described are net of the decrease in
agency costs associated with the decrease in equity.30.
increase debt. We assume that the other component of the
increased costs is itself an increasing function of the existing
debt-equity ratio. These increased costs include both the extra
risk premium demanded resulting from the correlation of these
bankruptcy costs with the market risk,28 and, also, the decline
in expected return due directly to the increase in expected
c (D/E)
bankruptcy costs. Call/the total increase in bankruptcy costs
from financing an extra dollar by debt instead of equity.
Now, the firm has chosen an equilibrium debt-equity ratio when:
ar
=(1_p)r(1_T)+apr(1_T)+c(D/E)
The existence of bankruptcy costs makes equity finance relatively
more attractive, and in equilibrium by enough so that the firm
is indifferent at the margin between debt and equity finance.
Since the function c(D/E) will vary by firm for many reasons,
particularly because of the variability of its stream of operating
eainings, the equilibrium debt-equity ratio will also vary by
firm, with firms having more variable earnings choosing a lower
debt-equity ratio. In Section II B, we measure empirically the
size of this variation in firm debt-equity ratios. The size
of c(D/E) in equilibrium will depend on the specific values of
a and ab .Wewill discuss below some empirical evidence on
the sizes of these parameters.
systematic component of bankruptcy costs is often
ignored. Animportantcause for systematic or market risk is
thesensitivity of corporate returns to general market conditions.
But a cyclical downturn is likely to increase the probability of
bankruptcy and its associated costs. Thus, firms with high
debt-equityare likely to have higher anticipated systematic
risk as has been suggested by Rosenberg and Guy (1975).31.
Let us nowexploreindividual debt-equity decisions by
looking more closely at the capital asset pricingmodel. When
looking at the individual's utility maximizingportfolio choice
in this model, we find as seen inGordon-Bradford (1979) that
for each individual an equationanalogous to 3.1 will be
satisfied for all securities. In theequation, however, a will
equal the ratio forthat investor, and the subscript M
will no longer refer to the marketportfolio but to that
individual's utility maximizing portfolio. Eachindividual
will own every asset in anon-zero, though not necessarily
positive, amount.29 However, individual portfolios willvary
due both to differing marginal tax ratesand also to differing
utility functions (if no risk free asset exists).Those with
lower tax rates would normally put a smaller(if not negative)
share of their portfolio intoequity, but everyone would be
active in the market for equities--unlessan individual is
completely indifferent to acquiring a share ofequity, at the
existing price, he can profitably eitherbuy or sell shares.
29Negative holdings of assetsought to occur only when
tax rate differences are very large. When all individuals have
the same tax rates, they all own a proportionate share ofthe
market portfolio. Except in degenerate cases (suchas Miller
(1977) where there is no uncertainty) portfolios willchange
continuously as the tax law moves away from equal rates. Large
changes in rates from equality would be necessary beforeany
holdings of equity became negative.2.
This conclusion contrasts with thecomplete portfolio specialization
implied by Miller's model (1977). Since he ignoreduncertainty,
he ended up with corner solutions whensolving for optimal
portfolios.
An additional implication of the model is that risk is
distributed inefficiently by the securities marketas a result
of tax distortions. Intuitively, the argumentcan be described
as follows. Recall that risk will be efficiently distributed
only if,at the margin,each individual demands the same risk
premiums (charges the same price) for accepting a givenlottery.
The basic point of the argument is that because taxes influence
portfolio choices this efficiency condition will not be met.
In equilibrium those in all tax brackets are indifferent
between debt and equity at the margin. Any relative taxadvantage
to equity vs. debt must therefore be counterbalancedby a larger
cos-t at the margin of bearing the risk in equity- -the risk
premium on equity ought to be larger for those with a relative
tax advantage in equity.3° Those with a relative taxadvantage
in equity demand a larger risk premiumbecausethey own relatively
more equity in their portfolio. As a result, there will bea
higher covariance of the return on new purchases ofequity with
capital asset pricing model implies that forany
given marketed security, an individual in equilibrium would
just be satisfied with the risk premium he does receive:
+ad
-max(j-,are), where a = .Thebehavior of
this expression as a function of a provides the justification for the statements in the text.33.
thereturn on their portfolio as awhole, leading to a larger
risk premium at the margin. Individualsin higher tax brackets
will find that equity tends to berelatively more attractive
than bonds, because these investorsobtain tax advantages from
therelatively favorable treatment of capital gains. Thosein
low tax brackets have a relative taxdisadvantage in equity
since the higher capital gainscomponent in equity carries little
advantage for them. Thosein the highest tax brackets also have
a relative tax disadvantage in equity sincetax exempt bonds
havesuch a high return after tax incomparison. Thus, the
condition for efficient risk spreading isnot achieved. Indiviuals
demand different risk premiums forholding additional limits of
equity on the margin.
In summary, when we allow for bothuncertainty and costly
bankruptcy, the implications for the firm's equilibriumfinancial
policy are:
1) Each firm will have its own optimal debtequity ratio,
with firms with riskier investmentschoosing a lower debt-equity
ratio. The debt-equity ratio is nolonger indeterminate, nor
is there an incentive to increase it withoutlimit.
2) Individuals will hold diversifiedportfolios, with
those in the lowest tax brackets owningrelatively little equity,
and those in the highest tax bracketsspecializing in tax exempt
bonds. Unlike in Miller (1977) there isno specialization of
portfolios.3lt..
3)Excess burden costs now arise from a) bankruptcy
costs, and b) inefficient spreading of risk across investors.
The magnitude of these costs is further explored in Section III.
These implications are much more realistic than those from the
previous model without costly bankruptcy. The elimination of
many of the earlier counterfntual conclusions makes us more
confident in the other forecasts from this model we will make
below.
C. A Note on Dividends
So far in our analysis including corporate and personal
taxes we have taken the payout rate as given even though the
firm has complete control over the dividends it pays. If we
allow the firm to choose an optimal dividend payout rate, what
do the models imply? When there are no taxes, we showed that
the dividend payout rate is irrelevant. Unfortunately, the above
models, seem to imply that, contrary to fact, no dividends ought
to be paid.1 While a few attempts have been made to rationalize
the payment of dividends, the size and stability of dividends
remains a puzzle.
When the firm considers the payout of available funds as
dividends, it faces the alternatives of using the funds for
repurchase of equity, new investment, or retirement of debt.
Let us look first at the equity repurchase option. Assume that
1A1ternatively, the implication is that dividends are more
valuedrelative to capital gains than one would have expected
given their relative tax treatments.35.
one dollar will be paid out by the firm this period either for
dividends or for repurchases, and that N shares exist initially.
If the firm chooses to pay dividends, then each shareholder
receives ,afterpersonal taxes. If the firm decides publicly
to repurchase shares, then the remaining shareholders experience
a capital gain of ,whilethe shareholders who sold out
experience a capital gain of the same relative size. This amounts
to after capital gains tax, which we assume is imposed on
accrued gains.32 Shareholders for whom c < n would prefer
repurchase to dividends and conversely.33
If instead of using the dollar to repurchase shares the
firm were to retain the dollar using it for new investment or
for repurchase of debt (equivalent at the margin) then the total
value of the equity would increase by an amount that we shall
denote by q .Optimalequity finance of investment implies that
the stock market ought to be willing to pay a dollar at the margin
for the returns from an additional dollar of equity-financed
real investment. Profit maximization thus implies that q 1.
Each share would experience a capital gain of after tax, so
in equilibrium retentions are equivalent to repurchases.
32The algebra is somewhat messier with a tax only at
rea lization.
33We abstract from transactions costs in this example.
If the debt-equity ratio is not in equilibrium, at that
moment, q1. After-tax capital gains on each share are then -.Aninvestor nowprefersretentions if and only if
q > .However,repurchases continue to dominate dividends
as long as c <n6.
How then does c compare with n ? The presumption of
course is that c < n .Itis this presumption which leads to
the conclusion that firms ought not to pay dividends. However,
not all investors will favor repurchases. For example, for
married couples filing jointly with under p200 in dividends,
n =0so c > n .I1so,for corporations owning shares in other
corporations, 85% of dividends received are deductible, so
n =.072,assuming a marginal corporate tax rate of 146percent.
The statutory tax rate on capital gains is .28, so that even
with the gain from postponement of the payments until realization,
one would expect c > n for corporations.In addition, tax exempt
institutions are sometimes constrained against spending capital
gains and so may prefer dividends.
What incentives does the firm face, given this disagreement
among shareholders? We assume that the firm's objective, and
implicitly that of a majority of its shareholders, is to maximize
the value of its shares, although such an assumptionmay be
questioned. What dividend policy then will maximize the value
of the shares? Under the assumptions of the capital asset pricing
model, the market weights dividends relative to capital gains
by a factor a which is just a weighted average of the ratios
across investors.35 The relative weight on any investor's
35See Gordon and Bradford (1979) for a derivation.ratio in determining a is larger forinvestors who are
less risk averse at the margin (infiniteif risk neutral),
probably giving corporations and institutionsrelatively more
weight in the determination of a
If,in spite of the extra weighton the less risk averse,
a< 1, then the firm can increase thevalue of its equity by
repurchasingshares rather than paying dividends. Thepresumption
that firms ought not topay dividends is equivalent to the
hypothesis that a <1.Fortunately, it is possible to estimate
the value of a statistically bycomparing the average returns
on equity in firms with similar riskiness but differentdividend
payout rates. Black and Scholes (l97.) find a to be
statistically indistinguishable from one, while Gordon and Bradford
(19T9) find that while a varies above and belowone over time,
on average it is fairly close to one.
-Thoughthese empirical results are consistent with firms
paying dividends since the stock market seems to value dividends
and capital gains equally, they raise thequestion of how the
market a can be around one when for somany investors, a is
well below one. We have shown that taxes do not affectall
investors the same way, however.Moreover, taxes are not the
Only factor affecting the relative value to investors of
dividends vs. capital gains. Transactions costs forexample will
favor dividends for many shareholders intending toconsume the
income. Small investors, for example, those with ,5,OOOor less38.
invested in a sample security, would face transactions costs
of well in excess of 10 percent were they to liquidate small
pieces of their investment in lieu of receiving dividends.
Alternatively, Black (1976) hypothesizes that investors have an
irrational preference for dividends.
Even if a is accepted to be around one on average, because
the estimates of a wander over time, another prDblem is created.
Only if a =1will the firm find it profitable both to retain
or repurchase and to pay dividends. While a1 it ought to
cease completely one activity or the other. Yet dividend payments
are extraordinarily stable over time. Some factor clearly is
being ignored by the models. To the extent that dividend
recipients, such as tax-exempt institutions, use dividends to
fund consumption, one can rationalize some desire for stability
in payments. However, many recipients do not consume out of
dividends, yet virtually all firms have very stable dividend
payments.
An alternative explanation for the stability of dividend
payments, explored in Bhattacharya (1979), is that the level of
dividends is used a a signal to investors concerning the financial
strength of the firm. This use of dividends as a signal seems
intuitively very appealing. Firms have such latitude in areas
such as inventory valuation, depreciation, writing off or capitalizing
certain expenses, etc., that it is not always possible to obtain59.
a good estimate of corporateearnings with either reported data
or earnings figures adjusted on the basisof publicly available
accounting information. A dollar ofearnings for one company
may not be equivalent to a dollar of earnings foranother. No
such ambiguity exists with a dollarof dividends, however.
Hence, dividends can be used in the financialcommunity as a proxy
for true earnings.
While the signalling role providesan explanation of how
dividend payments may benefit thefirm, through creating more favor-
able expectations of future profits,agiven dividend payout rate
also creates additional costs. Inaddition to higher personal
taxes, dividends increase the firm's need toseek outside funding,
or to cut back on investments, in order tooffset the loss of
internal funds. The firm itself mustpay substantial transactions
costs such as underwriters fees in orderto float new issues
of -debt or equity. Moreover, substantialnew issues can usually
be sold only at a discount fromprevailing market prices. The
firm is assumed to trade off thesebenefits and costs created
by additional dividends when choosing its dividendpayout rate.
More profitable firms, everything elseequal, will find any
given level of dividends relatively lesscostly since they will
use outside funding less frequently or at lowercosts. As a
result, they will choose a higher payout rate,enabling dividends
to be useful as a signal.1.O.
One implication of such a model is that the level of
dividends is now much less sensitive to the value of a ,as
now (1-a) is only part of the net costs in paying dividends.
This provides an alternative explanation for the stability of
dividends, given that a has wandered above and below one in
recent years. Once dividends are used as a signal of tnormaltt
earning power, one would expect firms to be quite reluctant to
cut dividends in response to a temporary drop in earnings (or
to finance a large investment) since the dividend cut might be
misinterpreted by the market.
For this signalling argument to be convincing, however,
several questions must be answered. First, are there cheaper
ways to signal profits than paying dividends? For example, commitments
to repurchase equity or debt would put the same financial pressure
on the firm, so provide the same signal, yet appear
to investors
tobe cheaper/since they imply lower tax costs. However, when
the tax costs of the signal are lower, firms have to signal more
aggressively in order to distinguish themselves from each other,
implying extra costs resulting from a drop in retained earnings.
It is not necessarily true that the total costs of the signal
are lower when the tax costs are lower.There is a second
that signal higher profits
problem with the argument in that increin dividends/result
in an immediate capital gain, yet the costs occur gradually and
Thus
in the future../tIere may be incentive for current shareholders
to signal falsely to induce a jump in share price, then to sell4l.
out before the costs must be paid. The taxation of capital gains
at realization could dampen incentives for such speculation.
More importantly, the threat of legal sanctions undoubtedly
provides a strong disincentive against such manipulation.
In spite of the progress made, we still lack a full
explanation for the nature of dividend payments. However, there
seem to be enough possible approaches that the overall model of
the firm is not undermined by the existence of dividends.
D. Inf1ationandCoporateFinancia1St
In the previous analysis, we implicitly assumed a stable
price level. What effect will the introduction of inflation have
on our results? The tax system is certainly not neutral with
respect to the inflation rate. in analyzing the effect of
inflation, let us first return to the certainty setting of
section lA and introduce a constant rate of inflation it
Wewill first look at the new equilibrium conditions, and then
investigate the effect of an unexpected change in the inflation
rate. Using the latter results, we will then explore the effects
of an uncertain but neutral inflation rate.
In the presence of a steady inflation rate, the firmts
investment incentives change for two primary reasons. First,
the real after tax interest rate will normally drop since the
inflation premium in the interest rate is tax deductible under
the corporation tax. If the nominal market interest rate is
r +it (sothat r represents the real market interest rate),
then the real after tax interest rate is (riit)(l_T) -it = r(l-T)-itT.)i2.
Forexample, if r =.03with or without inflation, and T =•5
the introduction of a ten per cent inflation rate causes the
real after tax interest rate facing the firm to drop from.O1
to -.035, a very dramatic change. A sufficient rise inr
could offset this drop. However, Feldstein and Summers (1978)
provide empirical evidence that inflation does not much affect
r .Incentivesfor real investment increase as a result.
while it is true that individual taxesmay tend to rise
with inflation since individualspay tax on the inflation premium,
this disadvantage will only be conveyed to the firmthrough a
change in the market rate of interest, i.e. through a rise in
the real before tax interest rate. There is no evidence,however,
that this occurs.
There is, of course, an offsetting increase in effective
tax rates on the firm since depreciation allowances decline in
rel value due to inflation when depreciation is basedupon
historical In addition, for firms not using LIFO
(last in first out) accounting procedures for theirinventories,
expenses in production will be understated for tax purposes--the
cost of goods drawn out of inventory would Je assessed at the
dollar price from an earlier date. These factorsdiscourage
real investment.
might view the shift towards more accelerated
depreciation formulas for tax purposes as an attempt to
alleviate this effect of inflation.11.3.
Expressing the combined effects in the notation used
previously, whereas without inflation optimal debt finance of
investment would imply s(1_T)r(1_T),37 with inflation firms
invest until s(l_T) + T(D_Da) =r(1T)-ItT,where D is the
depreciationallowance per dollar of capital in the tax law,
and where Dais the actual replacement rate per dollar of
capital.8Inflation causes D to be less than
Da
If the same percent of the capital stock depreciates both
in fact and in the tax law, but depreciation allowances are
based on historical costs, and if the capital stock has been
growing at g percent per year, then it can be shown that
T(D1a) =_ItT—-----.39If we again assume a ten percent
inflation rate, r =.03,and T = alongwith Da =.1
and g.02, then having depreciation allowances based on
historical costs causes the real after-tax interest rate faced
by the firm to rise by two percent. Since inflation also caused
the real interest rate to drop by five percent, there is a net
drop of three percentage points in the real cost of capital to
the firm.
37The effects of deviations in tax formula fordepreciation
from actual depreciation when there is no inflation continue
to be included in the definition of s.Modifications discussed
below, when uncertainty and costly bankruptcy exist, are ignored.
8There arenow several distortions in the composition of
investment. First, assets with different depreciation rates will
have different net rates of return in equilibrium. In addition,
marginal investments in the noncprorate sector will satisfy
s(1-m) + m(D-D )= r(1-m)-mn,implying in equilibrium a different
net rate of return than in the corporate sector.
391n order to estimate the net effect ofa marginal change
in the inflation rateon T(D_Pa), we approximate the messy1.
Letus now look at the implications of inflation for the
equilibrium debt-equity ratio when there is no uncertainty in
the inflation rate. The condition for an optimal debt-equity
ratio ir equation (3. ),onthe assumption that= j, implies:
c(D/E) =r(T(1_ab))
Hodoes this change when inflation exists?
-
(footnote39 continued)
accelerated depreciation formulas in the tax law by an exponential
depreciation formula. We also assume that actual depreciation
is exponential, and that, without
inflation tax depreciation and actual depreciation are equal.
Let us also assume that the firm's capital stock has been
growing at the rate g over time. This implies that t
periods ago, the real rate of investment (in current dollars)
was (D +g)e_gttper dollar of the current capital stock.
Of this investment, (Da +g)ea)tdt still exists. Tax
savings this period for depreciation allowances on the
investment t eriods ago is
in current dollars. Total tax
savings this period from depreciation allowances per dollar
of the current capital stock is then
D)t D+g)
I a at= Bydefinition,
a
::::_;:::'
Asa result, T(D_Pa)= TP(_.;.-_ - ])=115.
If we use the same line of arguments as before, and continue
to assume a 1, we find that:
c(D/E) =(r+t)(T_(l_ab))
Therefore the equilibrium debt—equity ratio increases when
the inflation rate increases, as long as T > (1_ab), since the
inflation premium on bonds is less heavily taxed than that on
- 4.1
equity.
Let us nci look at the immediate wealth redistribution
effects of an unexpected rise in the inflation rate, focusing
first on the equity holders. As a result of earlier investments,
the firm faces a schedule of depreciation allowances and interest
payment obligations fixed in dollar terms. Due to the unexpected
change in the inflation rate, the tax savings from depreciation
allowances drop while the real value of interest payment
obligations also drops. Back of the envelope calculations suggest
that the two effects roughly offset.2 If a firm had not been
1_oThe use of the capital asset pricing model in nominal
terms when there is inflation is justified in Gordon and
Bradford (1979).
le change in the real after tax interest rate facing the firm
may have a small direct effect on the function c(D/E) which
is the flow equivalent to the present value of bankruptcy costs.
However, if the expected costs are equal in all periods, then
c(D/E) will not change.
In calculating the gain from a drop in th real value of
debt, let us assume that one-third of the value of the firm is.
funded by debt, and that the average lifetime of debt outstanding
is ten years. The drop in the present value of debt payment
obligations is therefore: 10 -l0(rYl
1v[0(lT)_r(l_T)tdt+e_1Or(1_T)Ir(lT)e_(r+)(l)tat_e
Incalculating the loss in present value of depreciation allowances,
et us assume that exponential depreciation is a reasonable approximation
to actual accelerated depreciation formulas. If D is the ocrccntii 6.
using LIFO accounting, shareholders would experience an additional
(though largely avoidable) loss through a real increase in
corporate taxes.
In addition to this small net effect of inflation on the
profitability to equity holders of prior investments, there may
also be a change in the future prospects of the firm.If the
real interest rate does not rise too much accompanying the change
in the inflation rate, then it seems that the firm's investment
incentives will have increased. This effective drop in the real
after-tax interest rate (even taking into account the less
accelerated depreciation allowances) makes all new inframarginal
investments more profitable. The value of the firm's equity
would tend to increase by the present value of these extra
profits. Therefore, as long as the real interest rate does not
rise too much, existing equity holders would tend to gain from
an unexpected increase in the inflation rate, at least under
the circumstances we have been examining.
Even though existing equity may well rise in value in
response to an unexpected increase in the inflation rate,
write-off or remaining capital allowed per year, then the fall in
value or depreciationa1ionce would then be:
V[/7De_(Dr(i_T))tdt_ /TDe_n1T))tdtJ 0
Ifweletr.03, it =.06,T =•5andD =.10for a sample
clculaLion,thenthe gain in the value of the debt would be .03V. ith the same parameters,however, shareholders lose .09V as a
rsu1t of the smaller real depreciation allowances, giving a net loss of only .0lV. Whileboth effects individually are large, the net effect is small.existing bonds will surely drop in value. As aresult, the
debt-equity ratio (each measured at market, notbook, value)
will fall. Since this fall causes adrop in the wealth of
individuals who for tax and other reasonsprefer bonds, this
fall will to a degree be maintained in equi1ibriurn.1Conversely,
were the inflation rate to fall unexpectedly, there would bea
tendency for the equilibrium debt-equity ratio to rise.
When we allow the inflation rate to bestochastic, but
assume no uncertainty in relative prices, equity and bond
holders will face a distribution of possiblewealth transfers
resulting from the stochastic inflation rate, with the relative
magnitudes of the distributions that described above. Fora
given unexpected change in the inflationrate, it appears that
bond holders will be more strongly affected thanequity holders.
This increase in the relative riskiness of bondsought to result
in-a drop in the equilibrium debt-equity ratio.
These conclusions about an increased investment rateand
an immediate drop in the debt-equity ratio, withperhaps even
a rise in equity prices, seem very much at odds with actual
observations. For example, several studies (e.g.Body (197))
indicate a negative correlation between the inflation rateand
complication is that the rise in real tax revenues
resulting from the inflation may result in selective decreases
in tax rates or selective transfer payments which also alter
the distribution of wealth.
Inequilibrium, though, the debt-equity ratio will rise
unless the redistribution of wealth is sufficient.stock market returns. What we have found is that it does not
seem to be inflation per se that is the cause of the observations.
Other factors must have accompanied changes in the inflationrate,
whether by necessity or just historically, which have causeda
drop in the tock market and in investment. For example,
inflation tends to induce more restrictive governmentmonetary
and fiscal policies, possibly leading to a rise in the real
interest rate and a fall in both investment and in the stock
market. A threat of price controls, imposed so as to lower
profit margins, could also induce these effects. In addition,
the degree of uncertainty will normally increase beyond that due
to a stochastic overall inflation rate. Forexample, relative
prices are more variable when the inflation rate is higher, as
documented by Vining and Elwertowski (1916), making business
more risky. A strengthened OPEC could also hav increased
the uncertainty in the economy. This higheruncertainty also
reduces the investment rate and the level of the stock market.
The fact that the tax structure is not indexed does not in
itself lead to any unambiguous loss. One effect is tocause an
increase in the investment rate, reducing thegap between the
marginal return on capital and the marginal time preference rate.6
of this
orne/risk may be fairly easy to diversifyaway, however.
6We showed abovethat in equilibrium, under simplifying Tg-t assumptions,s =r-
.Incontrast, individuals
save until p =r(1-m)-mit,where p is their marginal time
preference rate. As long as
m < (ii÷),asit normally will be, the distortion between
savings and investment incentives is reduced when itincreases.14.9.
However,we noted above (in footnote 8) that the composition
of investment is distorted due to inflation, given the tax law.
In addition, there may be a rise in the equilibriumdebt-equity
ratio, leading to higher bankruptcy costs. There is no presumption,
though, that indexing the tax structure, leaving it otherwise
unchanged, will be beneficial.
Incentive forSathsadI,estrnerit
In the models with no uncertainty, we concluded that
corporations would invest until the marginal return on capital
equalled the market interest rate, even though a corporate tax
exists. The corporate tax therefore did not distort savings
decisions, unlike the personal income tax. Noncorporate firms
wouldalso invest until the marginal return on capital equalled
themarket interest rate, implying an efficient allocation of
capital between the corporate and the noncorporate sectors. To
what degree do these conclusions change when there is uncertainty
andcostly bankruptcy?
Let us first examine the equilibrium marginal return on
capitalin the corporate sector. Assume that the firm is considering
an extra dollar of real investment, financing'y percent of it
with debt and the rest with equity. The firm choosesy so
that the debt-equity ratio will continue to be optimal after
the investment. The firm will be indifferent to proceeding with
the investment if the expected rate of return on the investment
is just sufficient to compensate the bond and equity holders for
the use of their funds, given the risk that they bear.50.
In the context of the capital asset pricing model, assuming
a =1as found in Gordon and Bradford (1979), the indifference
condition implies
(E.1) (- yr)(1_T)+Xbr
=abr+ j(rm+dm_abrz) + CDy+CE(l/)
Here, r is the coupon rate on the bonds. The terms CD and
CE capture the effect on bankruptcy costs of a dollar of debt-
financed investment and a dollar of equity financed investment
respectiveiy.' We have assumed that returns on bonds and on
the riskiess asset receive the same tax treatment so that the
a weight on each is the same.
Equation (E.l) states that the return received by equity
holders and debt holders (the left hand side) must equal the
risk free rate plus the appropriate risk premium plus compensation
for any change in expected bankruptcy costs. Rearranging the
equation gives an expression for the equilibrium marginal rate
of return on capital:
— a 7-(l-a )
(E.2)s =r(y+(i-'y) - 'y(r-r)(—--j----T )+
j(rm+dm_abrz)CDY+CE( l-)
l_T + 1_T
Ininterpreting this equation, let us focus first on the
first term on the right hand side. Several earlier results in
the literature are special cases of this term, and ignore the
'ese terms will be influenced by the nature of the
distribution of the return on the new investment ,andits
covariance with the firmts existing investments.51.
other terms. In Miller's (1977)model, at the equilibrium debt—
equity ratio, ab =1_T,implying here that s =r
.In
Stiglitz (1973), optimal finance of new investment isall debt,
so that y =1,again implying s =r
.InHarberger (1962),
Feldstein (1971,.), and Shoven and Whalley (1972), thereare no
person:l taxes and no debt, so y =0and =1,giving
S=-i:;:--
Here,the story is much more complicated. The first term
embodies aspects of all the previous models. Thesecond effect
captures the fact that for debt holders, T percent of the risk
is absorbed by the government throughrisky corporate tax
revenues yet only (l_cxb) percent of the risk premium iscaptured
by the government. The third term captures the size of the
market risk premium, while the last termcaptures the effect of
this expansion of the firm on expectedbankruptcy costs.
To what degree do taxes distort the investment decisions
of firms, conditional on the optimal form offinance, which we
noted above is also distorted by taxes? Forno distortion to
exist, the marginal investment ought to earn the risk free rate
plus just enough so as to compensate for the social costs of the
risk and possible bankruptcy costs createdby the investment.
If the marginal costs of risk bearing by thegovernment were the
same as the marginal costs of risk born by the private sector
(as would be the case if risk is allocated efficientlyacross
investors), then the third term will measure the social costs52.
of risk bearing.18 There is no presumption, however, that the
last term will capture properly the social costs of increased
bankruptcy risk, though we might assume that the effect of pure
expansion of the firm on bankruptcy costs would not be very
important.If the expansion per se does not affect bankruptcy
costs, then the distortion created by the tax structure is
measured by the deviation of the first term from r .Simple
T-(l...a )
algebraimplies that this deviation equals: ——j.—— (r -'yr).
The equivalent distortion in Harberger (1962) is ——r
The distortion here is less than a third as iarge.
Our results differ from those in Harberger (1962) because
we explicitly allow for debt finance as an alternative to equity
finance, and take into account the effects of the personal income
tax. As Stiglitz (1973) noted, when a marginal investment is
financed by debt, there is essentially no corporate tax paid,
so no distortion.° Here, with y percent financed by debt, the
distortion is cut by V percent. As Miller (1977) noted, the
heavier personal tax on debt than on equity may offset the effect
of the corporate income tax, leaving equity as attractive as
debt on tax considerations, so implying no net distortion to
18Mayshar (1977) derives the appropriate Pigouvian subsidy
for the case when this assumption is not valid.
Forexample, for T =.)#8,y =.3,r =.063and r =
anda, =.7,the distortion as measured hee is .017 in contrast
to a distortion of .08 in Harberger.
'°If r =rin the formula, this claim follows precisely.
However, since T percent of the risk is absorbed in corporate
tax revenues whileOnly a of the risk premium to bondholders,
the treatment under debt 1s slightly even more favorable.53.
investment.Here the tax rate on debt is
implicitly (1_ab)
compared with the tax rate Tonequity, and need not be equal.
The tax disadvantage toequity now depends only on the
difference between these two rates.The total distortion is
smaller because of a compounding of thesetwo effects.
We will examine the excess burdencosts implied by this
distortion in section III. It isapparent, however, that these
results imply a much smaller distortionin investment and
savings decisions created by thecorporate tax than those found
in many earlierpapers.
II.
We have described the theoreticalconsiderations influencing
debt ratios in the economy. Taximplications suggest that high
debt ratios will be favored while thepossibility of costly
bankruptcy pushes in the opposite direction. In thissection,
we look at the facts both to gain someunderstanding of the
development of actual debt ratios in theeconomy and to examine
• their consistency with the theory. The first task is todevelop
a time series of debt-equity (or debt to totalcapital) ratios
for nonfinancial corporations.51..
?. Constructionof a Time Series of Debt Ratios
The construction of a time seriesof debt to total capital
ratios at book value wasrelatively straightforwar The total
sample of companies chosen was the 2,000companies available on
the StandardPoor's Cornpustat tapes. Onlynonfinancial
corporations were included in our timeseries, however. Debt
consisted of the sum of long term debtplus short term debt
reportedin current liabilities.Equity consisted of the sum of
the conrnon stock andsurplus accounts. In addition, the book
valueof preferred stock was treated asequity.Thedebt ratios
in the table are the ratios
DB/(DB+E)It should be noted that
not all of the companieson the Standard /Poor'stape had data
available for allyears. Hence, the atios shown inthe table
arenot for the same number ofcompanies in all years.
Themarketvalue calculations presentedmuch more of a problem.
It is simple enough toconstruct aseriesfor common equity at
market value. The year'sclosing price for eachcompany can
simply be multiplied by the number ofsharesoutstanding to
arrive at the market valueofequity. Serious estimation
problems, however, arose in attempting toarrive at a market
value for debt and preferred stockssince market prices of
preferred and debt instrumentsare not available on the Compustat
tapes. Fortunately, an unpublishedstudybyvon Furstenberg,
Malkiel and Watson (l98O),sponsoreby the American Council of
Life Insurance(ACLI),was available from which market values55.
couldbe estiniated.In the 1CLI study a market value tobook--
value ratio was estimated for eachtwo-digit industry in each
year by means of a sampling of actual bond prices forcompanies
in each industry from theyear-end editions of Moody's
Bond Survey. Weconvertedfrom book to market values bymultiplying
ap ropriate rear's
the book value figures by theMV/BV ratloestimated in the ACLI
study for the two-digit industry to which thecompany belonged.
Since the MV/Byratioswere estimated frcrn a sample of actual
market prices, webelievethat this technique gives us a close
approximation to the true market value of debt.
Similar techniques were used to estimate the value of
preferred stock. The ACLI study had estimated anaverage preferred
dividend yield by industry in eachyear. These estimates were
also arrived at by sampling actual price quotations eachyear.
Wethenestimate the value of the preferred stock for each of
the companies in our sample by multiplying thatcompany's
preferred dividends as recorded on the Cornpustat tape by the
reciprocal of that year's dividend yield for the industry to
which the company belonged as estimated in the ACLIstudy.
Theresulting debt to total capitalization ratios at market were
estimated as Dj(D 1EM). The book and market value estimates are
shownin colurnn' 1 id 2 of Table 1.
Wehave already noted that the data in columns 1 and 2 are not
based on the same numbers of observations. This could produce
seriouslymisleading estimates ofthe change in debt ratios over
time. For example, data may have become available for an
increasing number of hiqh debt firms over time leading to an56.
upwardbias in the time trend of recorded debt ratios.
in an attempt to deal with this problem, columns 3andt present
adjusted debt ratios.
in performing the adjusted calculations we took as a base
year the Deriod for which the maximum rurnberofcompanies with
both debt and equity measures wereavailable.Then we looked
at each pair of consecutive years to find the maximumnumberof
firms for which all data were available in both years. For
this common set of firms, we calculated the aggregate change
(growth)in debt and total capitalization. This calculation
was repeated for each consecutive set of years. Using the base
yearfor the level and the pairwise. seriesof growth rates to
recordchanges in that level, we obtained the adjusted measures
ofaggregate debt and totalcapitalizaticn. From these we obtained
thedebt to total capitalization ratios in columns3and1•
They embody the changes in debt-equity ratios for thelargest
corzon set of firms available in each air of years. The
adjustedseries provides a better estirate of changes in debt-equity
ratios in that in comparing debt-equity ratiosacross time, it
assurres merely a common rate of change in debt and total capitalization
across firms at any date, rather than a coomon value of debt—equity
ratios across firms. It will be noted that these columns reveala
somewhat smaller increase in debt-equity ratios than are shown in
the first two columns.
A further adjustment was made in co1unn five. Since1973,the



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































leases and unfunded pensions which, ineffect, represent debt not
included In the balance sheet. Column fivepresents debt to total
capitalization ratios adjusted not only for acommon set of companies
but also to include noncapi.talized leases andunfunded pension
liabilities as debt from 1973 on.Thus, at least from 1973 though
1978, it is jssib1e to judge if accounting for leasefinancing
and pensions would materially changeany observations that could
be made on the unadjusted figures.
-
Thesixth and seventh columns of the tablepresent a sorrewhat
different series of debt ratios. Here we measuredcorporate
debt a a percentage of the replacement cost ofcorporate assets.
These columns differ from the first coli.rns inseveral respects.
First,the company coverage is more IflcusIve in that all
non-financial corporations are included, notsimply those included
in ti-ic Compustac tapeb. COflUJy LflC UCDLIUtdbULe Lb b IIYIIL.Ly
different fromtheearlier one in that all short andlong term
interest bearing liabilities are includedless interest bearing
liquidassets. These data were estimatedfrom the flow offunds
accountsby George M. vonFurstenberg (1977)). Finally, the
debt ratio is figured notagainst the total value of debt and
eauity but rather against thereplacement cost of assets including
net fixed capital stock,land, and inventories. The latter
figures were obtained from theU.S. Bureau of EconomicAnalysis
and were also included in the
von Furstenberg (1977) study.
Finally,the debtat marketvalue measure was obtainedby a
somewhat more crude adjustmentthan that done inthefirst
columns.The adjustment wasaccomplished by assuming anaverage
maturityof corporate liabilitiesand imputing a capitalchange
from recorded changin marketinterest rates.59.
B.
The table shows a fairly consistent
pattern, irrespective
of themethod by which the debt ratioswere measured. Debt ratios
rise overthe period until the early 19703 andthen stabilize or
fall. The market value series tends torise somewhat less than
the book value series until1973.In l97, however, the debt
to market value ratio risessharply because of the collapse in
theequityruarket.While some of the sharp rise inmarket debt
ratios was revesed. as equity marketsrecovered during the
late 1970s, it is still thecase that aggregate debt ratios at
mrket were almost double their1957levelin 1978. We find in
colur-ins 3and,however,that whentheseries are adjusted to
acommonnumber of firms, the rise in debtratios is slightly
smaller. Columns 6and7showan even smaller increase in debt
burden.This is sobecause debt is compared with thereplacement
valueof corporate assets, whichrose sharply with the high
inflation rates of the1970s.In all the series,however, there is
evidencethat the rise indebt-equity ratios is arrested byl97
and tends to stabilizeor fall slightly in the lateryears.
The calculations incolumn 5deservespecial note. Here the
dataareadjusted for leases and pensionsafter 1973.It will be
notedthat the fall indebtratios sincel971.is much sharper in this
lease-and pension... adjustedseriesthanin the other book value
series in columns 1 and3.Zpparently,lease financing became far
less desirable in the latel970s following a ruling oftheFinancial
lccountingStandards Board changing thereporting requirements for60.
leases. Thus, firms tended to cut back leases more sharply than
ordinary debt. This conjecture is confirmed by examining the
behavior of the subset of Cornpustat companies reporting leases.
From19711- to 1978 there WaSlittlechange in the (DB/DB±EB) ratio
not including leases and pensions. The l971i ratio was .393 while
the 1978 ratio was .3811-. When leases and pensions are included
however the ratio falls sharply from .511 in l971 to .1162 in 1978.
Themajor cause of the decline wasthe behavior of the lease accounts.
Inother words, the major factor causing a decline in the lease- and
pension—adjusted debt ratios was a cutback in lease financing rather
then retirement of straight debt. These calculations suggest that
there was a sharper cutback in debt than is revealed by
the reported figures which do not include lease financing.
These data are consistent with the predictions of the theory
when we allow for taxes, uncertainty, and costly bankruptcy.
The gradual increase in debt ratio over the early period can
reasonably he explained as follows:
During the post-war period, corporate income taxes were set
at levels considerably higher than those of the 1930's and were
generally expected to remain at these higher levels.Moreover,
during the 1950's and into the 1960's, it became more and more
generally accepted that'deep depressions such as occurred in the
1930's were highly unlikely. Indeed, by the mid-l960's financial
analysts probably became overonfident about the general
stability of the United States economy and about our ability to
"fine tune" away even mild recessions. in short, during the
post-war period, analysts came to believe both that the economy
had become more stable and that corporate taxes would remain at
higher levels.61.
Thetheory developed above suggests thaton both counts the
debt-equity ratios should increase.Higher corporate taxes (relative to the prewar period) /increasethe tax advantages of debtfinancing. An increasing
recognition that the economy had becomemore stable suggests
that the probability ofbankruptcy involved in a given amount of
costs debt is lower and thus thatexpected bankruptcy/have declined.
Thus, for both reasons we would expectdebt-equity ratios to
increase oier the period,as indeed they did, according to the
table.
The cutback in debt-total capitalizationratios following the
1973-714shocks to the economy also seems consistentwith the
theory. Certainly few people believed in the1960'sthat the
economy would suffer a 9percentunemployment rate or that the
inflationratewould be measured in double digits. Fewer still
believed that both events could existsi!nultaneously. The
sharpness of the 19714-75 recession made it clear thatthe economy
was not as stable as had formerly been believed.Moreover, the
higher inflation rates of the 1970's further increased risk
perceptions. High levels of inflation are associated withgreater
variancein the rate ofinflation and with a greater dispersion
of relative prices as has been shownby Vining and Elwertowski
(1977).. On both counts one would expect thata given debt-equity
ratio would carry an increasedprobability of bankruptcy. Hence
it is possible that the debt-equity ratiosexisting in 1973-714
were considered higher than optirtal for the more unstable
economic environment. Certainly such astory is consistent with
the data showing some pull back in debt ratiosduring recent
years.62.
Our conjectures concerning changes in expectations about
the stability of the economy are consistent with data on actual
default rates for corporate bonds. The table below presents default
data from 1900 through 1977. Thedefaultrates listed are percentages
of the par values of bonds not in default at the beginning of a
given year that went into default during the year.










Source:T.R. Atkinson, in CorooeBondQua1i, 1966 fordata through 1965, Smith Barney, Harris Upham ,Co.,
"Trends in Corporate Bond Quality,"1966-l977, for
subsequent data.
The experience of the l9Osand1960s demonstrated that
default rates fell considerably below those recorded early in
the century. During the 1970s, however,
default rates did rise suggesting more instability
than was experienced during the 20 preceding years, although
default rates remained considerably below those of the earlier
years.63.
C• tI2fl.P Debt Re t OS
Wehave explained changes in debt ratiosover time in terms
of the tax advantage of debtfinancing pushing debt ratiosup
and the risk of bankruptcy and itsassociated costs restraining
leveraga.It is interesting to ask whether the riskexplanation
is consistent with the cross-sectiona1pattern of debt ratios
observedin the market. Our theorysuggests that individual
inherent
companies with the greatest/risk of bankruptcyought to have
the lowest debt ratios. In our empiricalwork, we hypothesized
that the companies with the largestinstability of cash flow
ones
will be the/most likely to experienceliquidity problems and
thus to face an inability to meet debt servicerequirements,
at any given debt-equity ratio.
The specific hypothesis tested wasDt/(D÷Et) =
+ t-(t-x))f'< 0where is the
variance of cash flow measured over the period from t back to
t-x and (+ ) isthe average value of the firm over the
period during which the variance was measured. The sample
consisted of all nonfinancial corporations on the Standard /Poor's
Compustat tape. Cash flow was defined as earnings available for
common equity plus interest plus depreciation and other noncash
charges. The variance of cash flow was measured by taking the
standard error of the estimate from an equation CF1a1 +bit,
fit to either ten or fifteen years of data. Division by the
average value of the firm was performed so as to normalize the
instability measure. Debt ratios were calculated at both book
and market.61.
Thetable below gives some representative results. In
general, debt ratios are negatively related to the variance of
cashflow.70aThe table indicatesthat firms with greater
instabilityof cash flow do have lower debt to totalcapitalization
ratios. The (book value) equationssuggest a range of variati.
in D/V ratios of about .07 for deviations of plus or minus
onestandard deviation from its mean. The relationshipwas a bit
stronger in the ten years to 1977than in the ten years to 1972.
Therelationship is also stronger when debt ratios are measured at
bookrather than at marketvalues. While the small "t"values arid
low correlations indicates that ourproxy for default risk i
undoubtedly inadequate, the results are at least consistent with
the theory developed above.
Coefficient of Debt Correla- TjaePeriod 2
cF/(DE)(and Ratio No. of tion
_-_-- Observations;
15 years to 1977 -0.97 Book Value 1701 .09 (-3.66)
15yearsto 1977 -0.13 Market ValuE 1730. (-2.00)
10 years to 1977 -2.2k Book Value 1096
(-5.10)
10years to 1972 -1.02 Book Value 1069 .12
(-3.91)
5Oaerealize that the variance of cash flow is measured with
error, resulting in a bias towards zero in its coefficient., Our concernhere is to confirm the direction of therelationship rather
than to measure precisely the size of the effect.65.
II I. _flçyaflyQft
In Part I, we described how the tax structure causes both
firns arid investors to alter their behavior in various ways.
However, wnen we consider various tax reform proposals in
Part IV, we will want to know the order of magnitude of the
efficiencycasts whenindividuals change their behavior in
responseto taxes. In particular, wewillwant to know how
sensitive the size of the excess burden is to various tax
parameters.In this -prt, we will attempt to estimate the
costs resulting from the distortions affectingdebt-equity,
investment, dividend payout, and individual portfolio decisions.
We will not, however, examine the costs of distortionsaffecting
savings decisions, viewing these as beyond thescope of this
paper.
in the final section of PartIII, we explore briefly how
various tax parameters affect thedegree to which the tax
system is equitable, as defined by either acomprehensive income
tax or by an expenditure tax. While theseconsiderations are
not quantified, requiring toomany arbitrary assumptions, they
are certainly as important when evaluating tax reformproposals.
• _____
1.Direct Measures of Bankruptcy Cost
It is not surprising that reliable economic studies
estimating the costs of bankruptcy do not exist. The main
problem is that data are generally not available. The Securities66.
andExchange Commission does not keep track of total bankruptcy
costs in any way that is generally accessible. Some private
lenders have records that show some, but not all, the costs of
a limited number of bankruptcies with which they have been
fulldata were available, however,
associated.Even if /thereare several conceptilial difficulties
indeciding what costs ought to be included. For example,
should the costs of a consultantwho was calledin to liquidate
a number of stores in the bankruptcy of one supermarket chainbe
includedas an administrative cost? This consultant may have
addedsufficiently to the liquidation value of the stores so that
his net value added was positive rather than negative.
a)Estimating_the costs_ofpg
In the hopes of shedding at least some light on the issue
of bankruptcy costs, we have examined four recent bankruptcies
in exhaustive detail. The data were collected from the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and from the files of two large
institutional lenders. In those files we could obtain the legal
and administrative costs of the two institutional lenders as
well as the costs of other institutional lenders in cases where
a consortium of institutions joined together in pursuing settlement
negotiations. We will refer to the costs of the itth private
lender as .Inaddition, certain general legal and
administrative costs (cG), such as trustees fees andfees of
outside legal counsel, were available in the files of the private
lenders or the SEC. However, costs incurred by other private67.
lenders were in general notavailable. We thereforeassume that
the identifiable costs incurredby these two lenders (both the
C and their share of the CG) as apercent of their holdings,
of the firm's liabilitiesequal the total legal and
administrative costs,CT, as a percent of the firmts total
liabilities, LT, so that:
EL
CEC.+ --C T r1 L G —=1 T
LT EL.
i 1
Table 2 below shows these costestimates as a percentage
of total liabilities.
Table 2
























Fora number of reasons the cost estimates inthe above table
are biased downward. First, the costdata are incomplete. Not
every disbursement is included and in sortiecases continuing
litigation is involved and substantialadditional legal fees are
anticipated. Moreover, the time andexpenses of the private
lenders' internal legal and financialstaff is not included in
theestimates. In many cases theproperly imputed costs of the
internal staff far exceeds the costof outside expert counsel.
Finally,the pre-petition liabilitiessignificantly overstate
the true worth of thecompanies.lssuming the value of the
settlementsare only about one-third the value ofpre-petition
liabilities (a reasonableassumption in these cases), the -
estimatesof percentage costs would be three times that shown in
the table.
-It is interesting to note the circumstances involved
in the bankruptcycase showing the highest costpercentage in the
table. It illustrates that firmsin bankruptcy often do notopt
for an early liquidationeven when it is in thebest interest ofthe
Aondho1ders to do so. In thiscase, the private lenders believed
it was in their interestto liquidate the firmimmediately in order
to maximize therecovery for the holders of the seniorSecurities.
The trustee refused toformulate a plan of reorganizationuntil
certain litigation against thecompany was resolved. This took
three years and resulted ina million liability. Z\bout twoyears
later, the Trustee filed a plan thatwasrejectedby the creditors.
At the end of almostseven years, an acceptable planwas finally69.
approved.As a result, legal fees ate up a substantial share of
the value of the assets that were available at the time the firm
went into bankruptcy. One might speculate whether there wasany
significancein the fact that the Trustee was a man in his 6 who
was receiving lOO, 000 a year in trustee fees, the highest salary
he had ever received.
A detailed examination of these cases reveals that the legal
and administrative costs may have been only a small fraction of
the total costs involved. Examination of theL: individual cases
showed that in some cases the bankrupt firm was unable to obtain
trade credit and found its normal sources of supplies of inventories
shut off. Moreover, these cases reveal that the companies
themselveswere often judged tobe unreliable suppliers with an
attendantunfavorable effect on sales. Moreover, the onset of
financialdifficulty often led to a loss of key personnel who
preferred to work for a company whose long term outlook seemed
more secure. Finally, in the cases in the table involving retail
establ'ishments, there was a tendency for assets to shrink
drasticallyduring the period of financial distress.
case of the operator of discount
-• The/departmentstores illustrates the typical pattern
when discount chains go into bankruptcy. First, charge account
customers stop paying their bills impairing the quality of the




Third, the chain typically finds it impossible to obtain trade
credit, which severely impairs its ability to finance its
inventories. The very fact of bankruptcy can thus cause a drama tic
change in the stream of income and cash flow available for the
firm.Finally,a review of these cases revealed that the
mnegemnent of firms in or near bankruptcygenerally found it
almostimpossible to devote its time and energy to business matters.
We thereforeconclude that while the identifiable legal
and administrative costs for a bankruptcy seem to be less than ten
percent of the par value of a firmts liabilities, this estimate is
often much too low. First, the firm is often worth much less than
its par value. In addition, omitted internal legal costs and the
disruptions in operation of a firm facing bankruptcy can easily
be very large.It would be very difficult to measure these other
costs directly, however.
There is another important aspect to bankruptcyproceedings
that bears on the cost issue. Courtreorganizations, in contrast to
liquidations, often involve in addition a substantial transfer of claims
from senior bondholders to subordinated bondholders and equity holders.
Reasons offered for this court bias are, for example, that the equity
holders (and the trade creditors) and the trustees are usually local
people, while the senior debt holders are not from the local
community. Moreover, management typically owns substantial amounts
of the equity and the courts often decide that it is necessary to
give management a continuing stake in the company after reorganization71.
so as to give them an incentive to perform well. An additional
reason for bias may be that the courts often feel the lender can
afford to sustain some of the loss in order to permit the debtor
to survive.
While we could not estimate independently the magnitude of
this transfer, we were able to assemble conclusive evidence that
such a transfer does in fact exist in court ordered reorganizations
in bankruptcy proceedings. We were able to find a sample
of recent bankruptcies where the estimated value of the securities
distributed to the senior debtholders was substantially less than
the total claim of those senior bondholders. Strict applications
of "me first" rules would imply that, in such a case, the senior
debtholders should receive everything of value the corporation is
able to distribute. The following table shows that in fact
subordinated debtholders received substantial settlements even
though the senior debtholders were not paid in full. Moreover,
since the equity holders received whatever equity was not distributed




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While the table does notshow the estimated marketvalue of
thesecuritiesreceived bi the seniorbondholders, we do have
Drirtiafadeevidence that the seniorbondholders did receie far
less than the nominal amountof their claim. The table doesshow
the interest rate receivedby the senior bondhQldersand, in some
cases, the date when interest paymentsare to commence. Even if
we assume that the securities receivedwere of the highest quality
and discount the interest payments to bereceived at the AA
for newly issued securities,
long term corporate bond rate/ we find that the seniorbondholders
in fact have received far less
inpresent Va hethin they were due. The last column in the table
doesprecisely that calculationfor the cases in whichthe senior
bondholder received debt securities insettlement of their claims.
It will be noted that even under thepolar assumption that the
securitiesreceived were riskiess, itisclear the senior bond-
holdersdid not receive fullpayment. Since the securities
received were in factrisky the argument holds a fortiorti.
TheUnited Merchants case, forexample, represents a clear
departurefrom the "me first" axiom. Theseniordebt-holders.
received 35 percent of its claim incashand 6 percent in notes.
Thesubordinateddebtholders received no immediate cash butwere
paid100 percent of their claim in debt securities.The terms of
the debt securities received by the holdersof subordinated debt
werh substantially more favorablethan those delivered to the senior
debtholders. The subordinated debtholders receivedtheir original
interest rate and were entitled to fullamortization by 1990,
while the notes delivered to the senior lendersaccrued no interestuntil July 1, 1985 and did not finally mature until 2025. In
addition, the restructured subordinated debt was elevated to
rank ari with the restructured privately held senior debt
in the event of a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
These cases illustrate that in most instances subordinated
debt has enjoyed subsequent recoveries even
debt was not a id in full. One might wonder why the senior
debtholders would agree to such reorganizations where their
recoveries were far less than complete. A major consideration
is uncertainties regarding the timing and settlement of a future
plan. For example, in the United Merchants' case a majority of
the senior lenders felt that, as unsatisfactory as the plan in the
table was, it was preferable to the unknown terms and timing of
a plan that might be arrived at by independent trustee under
Chapter 10 of the Bankruptcy Act. Particularly, since the settle-
ment would involve immediate payment of 35 percent in cash, the
senior debtholders feared they could do even worse later. Another
reason for acceptance of "uncertainty" settlements is the acceptance
of a compromise plan of reorganization to resolve a highly complex
litigation which, if prosecuted, might have taken many years to
resolve and would have impaired the business operations and growth
prospects of the company. This was the situation in the Equity
Funding case.
In sum, senior lenders have been persuaded to "give up"
recoveries to subordinated lenders primarily because of the
combined effects of the high administration expenses of extremely
long bankruptcies, concern about the delay, expense and7ta.
potential adverseresults of litigatedresolijo of disputes
over the relativeentitlements of holdersof senior andsubordinated debt, the benefits of "cashnow" in a "quickcompromise plan" as
comparedwith more speculativerecoveries from litigationof
"Unknowncash x years fromnow," and a desire insome cases to
avoid other risksperceived to exist inlong Chapter x cases.
Finally, it should be notedthat the legal foundationsfor
subordination has in recent
cases been perceived to besufficiently
cloudy that senior lendershave approvedsubstantial concessions
rather than attempt toestablish the full benefitsof senior debt
status through litigation.
Since the priorityof senior bondholders'claims on the
firm are more
ystematical1y reccgnjzed in aliquidation than in a
reorganiztj0 they also havean incentive to push for
liquidation,
even when this is not efficient51
Compounding this tendency is
the fact that seniorbondholders are due thepar value of their
bonds in liquidationeven if the market value of thebonds is much
smaller due to a general risein interest rates sincethe bonds
were issued. In contrast,other security holders wouldoften have
an incentive to avoid liquidationeven when economic efficiency
would call for it.
511nprinciple, each security holderought to receive in a reorganization at least whathe would have receivedin a liquidation• However, the courtsseem systematically to underestimate the liquidation value ofa firm.7)4b.
Thus in addition to the direct costs ofbankruptcy
mentioned previously, there are two furthercosts. First, since
the ownership share in thereorganized firm is very uncertain,
there are large financial risks foreach security holder in a
bankruptcy proceeding. in addition, the choiceconcerning whether
to liquidate or reorganization, and infact investment decisions
more generally, will often be madeinefficiently because the sizes
of the transfers among security holderscan be affected by their
decisions.
b)
Because of the legal and administrative costs involved with
bankruptcy,firms and their lenders do prefer informal reorganizations
so as to keep the company out of the courts and toavoid the heavy
costsof bankruptcy itself. Indeed, the reluctance ofprivate
lendersto force bankruptcy implies a substantial dead weight loss
from the bankruptcy proceeding. The rule of thumb used by one major
institutional lender is "We'll be happy to give up 20 percent of
what we should get on our bonds in order to keep the company out of
the courts, in which case we might lose 30 percent or more." This
30 percent estimate is made up of 10 percent in administrative and
legal fees and 20 percent via transfers from the bond holders to
the equity holders.
Court practices with respect to reorganizations during
bankruptcy thus influence informal reorganizations.In informal
as well as formal reorganizations thereis typically a substantial
"give-up" from the senior bondholders to subordinatedbondholders
and equity owners. Sometimes, reorganizations can be arranged
with little cost other than the aforementioned "give-up" bythe75.
bondholders. This could happen if all parties will agree to a
settlement.In many cases, however, it is not possible to arrange
a relatively costless and simple reorganization because it is not
possible to get the different securities holders •with different
claims and interest to agree, given the legal ambiguity in the
relative priorities of their claims. These disagreements can often
lead to protracted negotiations and even to litigation involving
heavy legal fees.
Thus in a reorganization, the security holders collectively
face potentially heavy legal bills, and in addition each faces
much uncertainty (costly in itself) concerning the size of his
ownership share in the reorganized firm. Thus, reorganizations
andbankruptcies are often quite similar--the principal cost in
both cases is the time and effort spent in negotiating a "work
out."Moreover, inmany cases it is impossible to arrange an
informal reorganization because it is not possible to identify the
public bond holders and to find anyone who speaks for them.
Even when a reorganization is easily effected without a
bankruptcy proceeding, substantial legal costs may still later
be incurred. A case in point is one concerning
a manufacturer of men's clothing.
This company's banks and major institutional lender entered into
an interereditors' agreement in 1977 that reorganized the
various creditors' claims and provided for additional bank
financing. Bankruptcy was not involved. The group is now being
sued for allegedly controlling the company's board of directors
and operating the company in a manner deleterious to the interests76.
ofthe company's shareowners. The suit claims damages almost
three times as large as the total liabilities and capital of the
company at the time the intercreditors" groups was formed. Thus
far, the total legal expenses incurred and committed by the major
institutiona! lender amount to close to 10 percent ofthetotal
loanof that lender. It is clear that even if the intercreditors'
group is successful in the litigation, the legal costs will
amountto a substantial percentage of whatever is ultimately
recovered on the investment.
In summary, reorganizations are typically 1es costly
than bankruptcy and, pjesree, the reorganizations
can be carried out with rriinirtial transactions cost. However, the
terms of the settlement typically involve thebonho1ders giving
a
up/significant percentage of the face value of the bonds to obtain
the agreement of the management and equity holders. Moreover,
when disagreements arise as to the work out of the settlement,
reorganization may be as costly as bankruptcy proceedings. Finally,
with different classes of public bondholders, it is often impossible
to carry out an informal reorganization. Sometimes bondholders
will have a preference for bankruptcy over reorganization despite
the former V5additionalcosts because the firm in financial distress
may find that it can obtain additional financing only by going
through a formal bankruptcy procedure. The reason is that the only
way a new lender can get a priority lien is by lending to the bankrupt
estate. The creditors of a bankrupt estate do get paid first and
this priority arrangement cannot be made in an informal reorganization.71.
appears
It /thenthat by increasing the likelihood of financial
distress,a highly levered capitalstructure imposes the possibility
oflarge and unpredictably variable costs on the firm and its
security owners. Moreover, a highly levered capital structure
imposes considerable extra monitoring costs on the part of lenders.
These considerations may help explain the currentpractice of
bondholders to set fairly stringent debt limits.Thus, in many
cases, even if the firm was willing to increase its leverage ratio,
it would be unable to do so either because of covenantsimposed by
current bondholders or by the unwillingness of prospective
bondholders to lend to the company.
2.Indirect measure of bankruptcy cost
Detailed examination of the experiences of firmswhile in
bankruptcy, as done above, provides information about certain
types of bankruptcy costs. However, not allefficiency costs
created by a high debt-equity ratio occurduring formal bankruptcy.
Firrs in financial distress experiencea variety of impediments their
that hinder /businessactivity and affect the stream of
operating arnings. These include difficulties inpurchasing
inventory, selling products and retaining keyemployees. Even
before any signs of financial distressoccur, however, the fi.rm
may find its flexibility limited. For example, a firm that has
borrowed up to the limits imposed by its lenderscould be forced
to pass up a profitable investmentopportunity because of an
inabilityto obtain timely financing. This is sobecause equity
financing generally involves long delays since registration is78.
normallyrequired by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In
addition, when a firm's debt-equity ratio is high, the managers,
acting in the interests of shareholders, face distorted investment
incentives because of the opportunity to pass on possible losses
to debt holders, to the degree that the covenants in the debt
contract do not explicitly prevent such behavior. (Shareholders
themselvespaythis eficiency cost, to the extent that bondholders
anticipate such behavior andcharge an appropriate interest rate.)
Substantialcosts can then arise even if the firm never
experiences a liquidity crisis. There is little possibility of
rreasuring such costs directly.
However, we can approximate indirectly the total efficiency
costs through use of the first order conditions for an optimal
debt-equity ratio. In Section II, B.3, we showed that a firm,
when considering marginal debt vs. equity finance, will compare
(l_p)r(1_T) +czpr(1_T)_arfwith abr -arf
-c(D/E),where c(D/E),
the extra costs (measured as a flow) arising from having a dollar
more debt instead of equity, captures all considerations other
than tax effects, which enter into the debt-equity decision.52
As such, c(D/E) includes efficiency costs beyond those occurring
during a formal bankruptcy.
52However, costs incurred by existing bondholders, since
ignored in the marginal debt-equity decision, are also omitted
from c(D/E). To this extent, our estimate of marginal efficiency
costs will be too low. Our estimate will also be too low to the
extent that other social costs of bankruptcy (disruption in trade
or employment) are not passed on to equity holders through appropriately
higher prices.79.
Whenthe debt-equity ratio is in equilibrium, these two
expressions will be equal, implying c(D/E) =r(T_(l_ab)
+
ofthis equation
(l_a)(l_T)p). If we can measure the right hand side/(letus denote
it by c*), then we can infer the marginalefficiency cost at
equilibrium of a dollar shift between debt and equity.
Though the marginal efficiency cost at a point is not
sufficient to measure the total cost, we can still derive arough
approximation to the total cost. To begin with, we presume that
c(0) 0--the marginal efficiency costs of adding the first dollar
of debt would be very small. In addition, wepresume that
.cD/EI > 0.Giventhese assumptions, the value of c(D/E) as
D increases (with offsettingchanges in E), appears as curve GAB
in Figure 1.The area OABD then describes the total efficiency
costs created by a levered financial structure with debt =D.Let us







One would normally expect the curve OAB to be convex,
since for relatively unlevered capital structures the firm runs
little risk of bankruptcy. Thus, this approximation will undoubtedly
be biased upwards by the shaded area in Figure 1.80.
In order to get an idea of the quantitative importance of
the efficiency costs, we need values for c* and D .Inmeasuring
c* ,letus assume that a =1(a figure consistent with our
theory basically consistent with the estimates in Gordon and
Bradford (1979)). We have no similar estimate of ab .However,
in appendix A, we find that the interest rate on tax free bonds is
only 75/O of that on taxable bonds with comparable risk.This
implies that ab ought to be around .75.53If we then assume
the corporate borrowing rate to be 6.3°/o (the commercial paper
rate in 197), then c* =.0ll.Given von Furstenberg's
(1977) estimate for corporate debt of 10 billion dollars in 1975,
our estimate of is then 3.2 billion dollars. This
represents the annual efficiency costs arising from the existence
of risky debt.
In PartV, we will want to forecast how this efficiency
cost will vary if particular tax rates are changed. Our assumption
that a =1,while supported by the estimates in Gordon and
Bradford (1979) under existing tax rates, is also implied by an
internal optimum for the dividend payout rates as shown in Section
lIC. We therefore assume it will continue to hold. If we then
continue to assume a triangular approximation to area OAD, then our
531f the risk is the same on these bonds, then the risk
premium ought to be the same. If ar represents the expected
return on taxable bonds and a rç rpesents the expected return
on tax free bonds with compara1 risk (each as valued relative to
the equivalent amount of capital gains), then it must be that abrb
arf .Sincerf :.7 r,wefind that a : czf .However,
it Is reasonable to suppoe that ac1., snce ac represents
the value in the market of tax fre interest relattve to a dollar of
capital gains, and capital gains are at worst relatively lightly
taxed. It follows that a
5Insect-ion I.D on inflation, we found that this use of
the nominal interf rate is appropriate when measuring the size
of the tax distortion favoring debt finance.81.
measure of the efficiency cost isproportional to the square of
If r is not much affectedby Torab ,aswould
be the case with the free flowof capital across international
financial markets, thenefficiency costs are proportional to
(T(1a))2
Letus reemphasize that this estimate of theannual
efficiency costs is very rough. Due to thetriangular approximation
in Figure 1, our figureprobably overestimates the area OI½BD.
In addition, however, area OABDrepresents only the costs born by
the coalition of equity holdersand the junior bond holders. True
social costs of bankruptcy, and themoral hazard costs associated
with risky debt,may well be quite a bit larger than this area OABD.
Finally, the parameter estimates for a andab used in constructing
our estimate of bankruptcy costs, areimprecise.
Whatever the precision of ourestimate, however, we find
that direct legal and administrativecosts of bankruptcy seem to
be a small fraction of the totalefficiency costs of risky debt.
In l97, for example, the total liabilitiesof bankrupt firms were
1 billion dollars. Forany plausible
tht ough
fractionofthis total thatis lost/bankruptcy costs, Whichwe
estimate to be nolarger than 1O/° in the previousSection, these
direct costs arevery small relative to ourestimate of the
total efficiency costs. Our indirectestimate ought to bemuch
larger, though, since it includesmany costs of risky debt
described earlier in addition tolegal expenses in bankruptcy.
For example, firms thatnever quite go bankruptmay spend resources
to avoid bankruptcy.Also, investment incentives are inefficient
when debt is risky. We haveno direct evidence on these costs to
compare with the indirect estimatespresented here.82.
For purposes of comparison, our estimates of the total costs
they
are under half a percent of GNP in 1975,so/aresmall in an
aggregate sense. However, corporate tax revenues in 1915 were
only10.6 billion dollars, so the excess burden costs could
he on theorder of 10% of corporate revenues. We explore below
how sensitive our estimates are to changes in the various tax
parameters.
B ,Efficiencycosts arising from inefficient riskbearing
InSection II.B., we noted that variation in individual tax
ratesimplies an inefficiency in the allocation of risk across
investors. Here we attempt to approximate the order of magnitude
of these costs.
Efficiency in the allocation of marketed lotteries would imply
that eah person at the margin would demand the same risk premium
in return for absorbing a given risk. With the current
tax structure, in equilibrium, in return for absorbing (1-c) per
cent of the uncertainty in a dollar of equity in a given firm,
each investor would just be willing to accept the after tax risk
premium(1-c) +(i-m)-max((l-m)r, rf) .1këIiT1I±i
perunit of risk, +L1-m)d -j max((l-m)r2,rf) will vary
across investors, implying the possibility of a Pareto improving
reallocation of risk from those charging a large risk premium to
those charging a small one.83.
Letus plot the marginal risk premium as a function of
a = makingthe simplifying assumptions: 1) c =.2m,
2) rf =.75r,55 3) d =.6r
,andi) g =r
.Recallthat
when risk is distributed efficiently, all investors would have
the same marginal risk premium. Figure 2 indicates that those with
the lowest risk premium (those holding "too little" equity) are
those in the highest tax brackets, for whom tax free bonds are
extremely attractive. Those in the zero tax bracket also have
little equity (have a low risk premium) as they receive no gain
from the relatively high capital gains component in equity. Those
who are just indifferent between taxable and tax free bonds have









tax bracket .70 .37 .25.00
55The evidence for this figure in Appendix A is derived
fromlonger term interest rates. It maybe that were we to have
comparedshorter term interest rates, the relative rates would
be different, with rf presumably being smaller relative to
since those holding shorter term bonds are mainly commercial banks.8.
How costly is this variation in the marginal risk premium
across investors? Theoretically, this cost is very complicated
to derive. For a marginal reallocation of a given risk from an
individual with a high risk premium to an individual with a low
risk premium, the efficiency gain is the difference in their risk
premia. In the example in Figure 2, the maximum such gain would
be .3r2 .Thetotal efficiency gains from reallocation would
be the sum of all such marginal gains, when this reallocation from
the initial equilibrium continues until all individuals charge
the same risk premium for each security.
In order to approximate the order of magnitude of these
efficiency costs, we derive in Appendix B the size of the costs
under a set of simplifying assumptions. There we find that
annual efficiency costs resulting from the inefficient distribution
2 of corporate risks across investors can be approximated by .O1rV,
where V is the total amount of risky securities outstanding.
If r is assumed to be .08, and we set V equal to the value
of corporate equity outstanding in 1975 (630 billion dollars
according to von Furstenberg), then this expression equals
.00007V =11i milliondollars per year. To the extent that the
parameters and model chosen are reasonable, efficiency costs due
to inefficient risk bearing would appear to be very small.
C. Efficiency costs induced by the distortion in dividend payout rates
Another major distortion created by the current tax structure
is that it discourages the payment of dividends by corporations,.85.
Whilethe corporate income tax includesno such distortion, since
dividendsand retained earnings are treatedequivalently, the
effective personalincome tax on dividendsis much higher than
that on capital gains for individualinvestors. As a result,
individuals are led to alter theirportfolio composition towards
assets with a higher capital gainscomponent, and corporations
areinduced to cut their dividendpayout rate. Unfortunately,
it is not even clear whether thesechanges in behavior have
efficiency costs or efficiency benefits, letalone what the
magnitude of the effect on efficiency is.The problem is that
our theory explaining the payment of dividendsis still very
incomplete.
In Section I.C, we provided threepossible explanations for
why dividends are paid: 1) since someequity investors, particularly
corporations, will prefer dividends to capitalgains because 8
percent of dividends are excluded fromtax, it may be that the
valueof dividends in themarket just equals thatof capital gains,
2)dividends have theadvantage over capital gains ofproviding
a means with lower transactionscosts to fund consumption
offsetting their tax disadvantage,and 3)dividends carry a
signallingbenefit, again offsetting the taxdisadvantage.
Unfortunately, each explanation fordividends has different
implicationsfor the effect onefficiencyof the tax distortion
discouragingdividends.
Under the firstexplanation, individuals are indifferent,tax
reasons aside, between dividendsand capital gains.Therefore,85A.
the fact that their portfolios are shiftedtowards securities
with a higher capital gainscomponent has in itself no cost.
Risk spreading will be inefficientas a result of this shift, but
we have already measured that effect.
Under the second explanation,any reduction in the cash
component of the return on the portfolio ofan individual who use.d
the proceeds to fund consumption willresult in higher transactions
costs for that individual who then must incurthe brokerage
in selling shares to replace lostdividends.
costs involve4/. To the extent that firmsreduce their dividend
payout rate, resulting in an increase in their internalfunds,
the transactions cost of firms will decreaseif in response they
are able to avoid some underwritingexpenses involved in new
issues of debt or equity. On the otherhand, the transactions
costs of firms will increase if inresponse they increase their
repurchases of debt or equity. Of course firms of theformer type
will be much more inclined to reduce theirdividends than the
others. Without taxes, in equilibrium, thevarious transactions
costs would betradedoff against each other.Introducing
taxes then results ina tradeoffbetween extra taxes and extra
transactions costs. Measuring the netincrease in transactions
costs induced by the tax distortionwould be very complicated.
When dividends play asignallingrole, as discussed in SectionI.C.,
th2 firm, when choosing a dividendpayout rate, trades off the
induced improvement in investorexpectations resulting from higher
dividendswith the higher tax rate forinvestors on dividends
and the implied increaseincostsfor the firm resulting froma
decreasein its retained earnings.Here, investors may well be
indifferent between dividendsand capital gains. Theonly efficiency
costs involving the dividendpayout rate are then the costs to86.
thefirm of a reduced level of retained earnings. These costs
would he smaller were the equilibrium dividend payout rate smaller.
Therefore, any furthertax distortion discouraging dividends
would decrease the efficiency costs. Even ifthetotal costs to
the firm ofusingdividends as asignal go up as aresult of this
increase in the tax distortion, the real costs, incontrastto
the tax costs, go down.
Thus, depending on our explanation for whydividendsare paid,
t.he tox distortion discouraging dividends may have no direct
efficiency effect, an efficiency cost, or an efficiencybenefit.
Thereisno a priori presumption which direction of effectis
more important.
D. Distortion favoring noncorporate vs. corporate uses of capital
Another frequently measured distortion created by the corporate
income tax is the implied disincentive to invest in. corporate rather
than noncorporate businesses.7 According to Shoven (1976), the
annual excess burden costs created by the distortion in capital
allocation betwee.n corporate and noncorporate uses is on the order
of six to fifteen percent of corporate revenues, or about 1-.26 billion
dollars in 197. What do our models imply, in comparison?
In section I.E, we showed that when we allow for uncertainty and
bankruptcy, the equilibrium rate of return on capital in the corporate
55algnored here as elsewhere is the fact that a business may
shift from a corporate to a noncprorate status as a result of the
corporation tax.86A.
sector(correcting for the risk premium and the bankruptcy premium)
will exceed the equilibrium rate of return in the noncorporate sector
T-(l--ab) by —=———(r-Yr)
.Usingplausible parameter values for 19'75,
this implies that the rate of return on capital in the corporate
55b sector will be 27.1'° higher than in the noncorporate sector.
Shoven (1976), in contrast, assumes that as a result of differential
taxation on the returns to capital in the two sectors, the equilibrium
rate of return on capital in the corporate sector will be 53.0%
higher than in the noncorporate sector.SSc
The excess burden costs implied by such a distortion should be
approximately proportional to the square of the size of the distortion.
Our results then imply excess burden costs only =.267the
size of the distortion costs found in Shoven (l976). In 1975,
we then forecast excess burden costs due to the misallocation of
capital between corporate and noncorporate uses of 1.1 billion dollars.
Note that this distortion, which has been the standard distortion
considered in the public finance literature, seems to be only about
a third as costly as the distortion in debt-equity decisions.
SSbwe assumeT= .Ii.8,%= .75,r =.063,r =.08,V =.3.
SSCIn Table 2, he shows that the tax rateon noncorporate capital
is 31% while that on corporate capital is .Ifthe after tax
rates of return are to be equal, the before tax rates of return must
differ as asserted.
5,dmis approximation isvery rough. Had we measured the rate
of return in the noncorporate as a percent of the return in the
corporate sector throughout instead of the converse, the excess
burden implied by our results would be .386 the size of that, in Shoven.86 B.
Since this estimate of the excess burden costs isapproximately
proportional to the sguare of the size of the tax distortion, it is
t-(1-a ) 2 proportional to
[(—--------------—)(r-Yr)] .Whenconsidering the
effects of tax changes in the next section, we will use this
approximation.
B.Progressive taxation andtaxation of corporate earninq-s
So far, we haveexplored only theefficiency effects of the
tax treatment of corporate earnings. To whatdegree does the
existing tax structure also create horizontaland vertical inequities
Letus assume first that a comprehensive incometax is the
normative model in judging horizontaland vertical inequities.
Under this tax, the relative net oftax rates of return onany
1-rn1 security for two individuals ought to be
i—--—, where
in1and
in2arethe marginal tax rates on labor incomefor the two
individuals. This condition is impliedby equal tax rates on
allforms ofincome. The condition isessentiallymet for taxable
bonds, ignoring any capital gains component in thereturn. For
d(1—m1)+g(i-c1) equity, however, the relative rates of returnare
whered is the dividend yield andg the capital gains rate87.
on that security, and c1 and c2 are the effective tax rates
oncapital gains for the two investors. This ratio willnot equal
1-rn1,implyingthat the current tax is not a comprehensive
In2
incometax.Moreover, a comprehensive income tax would presumably
require that capital gains be taxed on accrual at the tax rate
on labor income.
Similarly,the current tax is not consistent with a consumption
or expendituretax. Under a consumption tax, the net of
tax rate of return on anysecurity ought to be the same for all
investors(and equal to the pre-tax rate of tax). Yet as long
as individuals invest directly in corporate securities rather
than invest through pensions or Keogh plans, the net of tax
rates of return will not be equal.
Ithetax system is to beconsistent with either a comprehensive
income tax or withaconsumption tax, it is necessary that the
ratio of pre-tax rates of return on debt and equity equal the
ratioof post-tax rates of return--under a comprehensive income
tax, both would be taxed at rate m ,whileunder a consumption
tax neither would be taxed. Does the corporation tax also create
inequities? Whenindividualspurchase a share of stock, their
incoc,e is the return on this financial security--dividends and
caoitl gains. An equitable individual tax would be concerned
just with this income, not with the income of the coxporation
necessaryto support these payments. Under this view, the
corporation tax is not an equity issue.6 An ambiguity arises
when comparing closely held corporations to partnerships. Here.
a legalre-classifi.cation will change the definition of the
6Writersfrequently argue to the contrary. Claims that the
double taxation" of dividends is inequitable would be an example.88.-89.
individual's ir1corne while no substanive change has occurred in
the individual's position. The corporation provides a device for
onstDJning the receipt of income through retentions, unavailable
in a partnership. If capital gains were taxed fully on accrual,
this ;ould not be an issue, however,5 so the corporation tax is
not ineitable per se. However, by discouraging incorporation,
the crporetion tax diminishes use of the corporation as a device
to exploit the lower tax rates on capital gains.
IV. Evaluation of Proposalsfor Tax Reform
A. Criteria for evaluation
We have shown in the previoussections that the current
procedures for taxing corporate earningscreate non trivial excess
burden costs and deviate froman equitable tax, as defined either90.
by a comprehensive income tax or by a consumption tax. in light
of these efficiency and equity problems with the current tax
structure, many proposals for tax reform have been suggested.
In this part, we will compare briefly the relative merit
o séveraIpossible directions of change in the tax code. in
most cases, we estimate the efficiency gains and revenue costs
created by a small change in a tax rate. Were the tax structure
optimal,then the efficiency gains relative to the revenue costs
ought to be the same for all taxes. When this ratio is different
for two different taxes, then there is an opportunity to change
thetwo tax rates so as to maintain tax revenues yet lower the
excess burden created by the tax structure. That tax rate with
thehighest ratio of efficiency gain relative to revenue cost is
then a prime candidate for reduction. Our results will point out
which directions of change in the tax structure ought to be most
favorable. However, they will not indicate how large a change would
be appropriate.
in comparing the effects of different tax changes, we will
focus on the distortions in corporate financial policy, and in
the allocation of capital between the corporate and the noncorporate
sectors.8 Omitted most prominently is the distortion in savings
behavior. To include this would require a theory of the market
interest rate, a theory which is clearly beyond the scope of this
8Inefficiency in the allocation of risk across investors
is too small to merit attention.91.
paper. We also ignore distortions affecting the dividend payout
rate, as even the direction of change in excess burden costs here
is unknown. In addition, we exploresolely partial equilibrium
efficiency effects, ignoring any secondary effects through shifts
in demand among commodities. Thus thestory told is incomplete
and must be supplemented with other findings. The effectswe do
capture, though, are large enough to merit close attention.
In addition to comparing efficiency gains with revenue costs
for each tax change, we will also point out how each taxchange
will affect the equity of the taxation of income, and how each
taxchange may result in windfall transfers of wealth across individuals.
We will not attempt to compare, though, the relative importance
ofeffects on the equity vs. the efficiency of the tax structure.
B. Proposal Evaluation
Inthis section we will evaluate alternative tax proposals.
Each of the tax changes we will compare is listed in Table 1along
withthe implied effects on the excess burden and on tax revenues.
In calculating effects on efficiency, we focus on distortions in
corporate uses, and distortions in the allocation of risk across
investors. Other distortions are ignored, however. In particular,
we make no attempt to measure the inefficiency in savings decisions,
nor can we measure the efficiency effects of distorted dividend




Efficiency and Revenue Effects of Selected Tax Changes
Efficiency Revenue
—Gain Loss
1.l°/° decrease in 'r 171 million 123 million
2..01 decrease in c 238million 193 million
3.1'/°ofdividends deductible
under the corporate tax 0 70 million
1..lu/oof interest payments
taxable under the corporate tax 1l5 million -2Il5 million9.
From the first line in Table 1, we see thata small cut in
thecorporate tax rate/would result in an effic iency gain a lmost
half again as large as the revenue loss. In otherwords, the last
dollarcollected under the corporate income taxeffectively costs
the private sector 2.1 dollars, one dollar in lost incomeand l.li. dollars in
increased inefficiency. Were distortions insavings decisions
included,the efficiency effect would beeven larger. Either this
taxis much more expensive than other taxes, in whichcase it ought
to be reduced, or it is more equitable,whichwe find unconvincing.
Alternatively, /marginalgovernment expenditures ought to be more than twice as
"valuable" as marginal private expenditures.
Theimplications of cutting the effective capital gains tax
C,
rate,/arevery similar. This change lessens the degree to which
taxes discourage equity finance. Again, a dollar ofgovernment
revenue effectively costs the private sector more than two dollars.
In spite of the discussion concerning the double taxation of
dividends, we find no clear efficiency gain from allowing corporations
to deduct part of their dividend payments, and yet clearrevenue
costs. One way to understand this result is to recognize that
corporationscan avoid this tax by repurchasing shares instead of
paying dividends. To the extent they pay dividends, it
mustresult from compensating advantages to dividends. As we
discussed in section IV.D, it is unclear whether the resulting
changes in dividend payout rates produce efficiency gains or
efficiency losses.94..
In the fourth line of the table, we find the even more dramatic
result thatby eliminating to a small degree the deductibility of
interest payments under the corporate tax, there would be both an
efficiency gain and a revenue gain. Though the distortion in
savings decisions may be increased by this change, the cost
of this further distortion would have to be very large to undermine
the attractiveness of this tax change.
Each of these computations describes the effect of a small
tax change. For larger tax changes, the efficiency gains would
be smaller relative to the revenue losses. This occurs since the
excess burden varies as the square of the distortion while tax
revenue changes approximately linearly with the distortion.
In the rest of this section, we present our derivation of
the figures in Table 1, and discuss some of the equity implications
of these tax changes. In addition, we present a brief discussion
of the -effects of shifting entirely to a partnership trethnent of
corporate income or to an expenditure tax.
1. Reduction in the corporate tax rate
The principal efficiency effect of reducing the corporate tax
rate is to lower the distortion favoring debt over equity finance
and the associated costs. The size of the initial excess burden
is proportional to (.T-(1-ab))2, as was argued in Section III.A.2.
We have estimated to be .75 using the results in Appendix A,
and assume that this value will remain unaffected by the change
in the corporate tax rate. A one percent reduction in 'rwould
then lead to a ll-.1'Y° drop in the excess burden or a gain of 132 million
dollars per year.97.
The size of the excess burden from the distortionof investment
r-( 1_ab) decisions was proportional to[(_=___)(ryr)]2.Ifr drops by
one percent, then, according to the triangularapproximation to
Figure 1, D will drop by 2.1 percent. This changetogether with
the change in rimplies that the excess burden on investment will
fall by 3.14%, or by 39 million dollars. The totalefficiency gain
is therefore 171 million dollars.
What equity considerations would enter into this taxchange?
As noted above, changing the corporate rate does notdirectly
affect the degree to which the personal tax approximatesan equitable
tax. Since debt equity ratios will fall,however, more of savings
invested
will be/in equity, where the tax treatment isrelatively less
equitable than under a CIT. (Consumption tax advocates might view
this shift towards equity as an improvement, though.) Inaddition,
ordinary
more partnerships may incorporate, further shifting/income into
capital gains.
Who will receive the windfall transfers implicit in the cut
in the corporate tax rate? On first glance, one wouldexpect
•substantial capital gains on equity. However, if equity outstanding
is initially in equilibrium (q =1),this may not be the case.
When the amount of equity outstanding is again in equilibrium, it
must be that equity holders still value the returns (after corporate
tax) from a dollar of marginal real investment at a dollar. Equity
may rise in price immediately, but firms will expand the supply of
equity, cutting back on the supply of bonds, until the price falls96.
backtowards its original level. Anticipation of this eventual drop may
restrain the initial rise. Even though in equilibriumthe new marginal
holderof equity values the returns from a dollar of realinvestment
at a dollar, the increased intramarginal holdings of equitywill
be valued at more than a dollar, so consumer surpluswill have
could
increased. There /beno substantial windfall changes in price,
butthere will be windfall gains in utility. Since thosein higher
tax brackets have relatively stronger preferences foruity over
corporate bonds, it is this group which will mainly experience
these windfall gains in utility. In addition, existing bondholders,
having a lower probability of bankruptcy, will also experience
windfall gains.
How large would the revenue loss be from such a tax change?
In 1975, a one percent cut in the corporate income tax rate,if
corporate behavior did not change, would havecaused a drop of )-i-06
million dollars in corporate tax revenues. The resultingo6
million dollar increase in corporate revenuwouldaccrue to
shareholders. If their average marginal tax rate is .157(the figure
used by Feldstein and Summers (1979)), then taxes on shareholders
would increase by 6.s- million dollars. In addition, however,tax
revenues will increase due to the shift towards equityfinance.
According to the triangular approximation to Figure 1, a one
percent drop inr will lead to a 2.1 percent dropin D .Given
the availability of tax free bonds with rf =.75r,themarginal
tax rate on bonds ought to be 2570 .Incontrast, the marginal97.
alevel tax rateon equity income would be (1-(l-.I8)(l-.l57)) =.56,/.31
higherthan that on debt. The shift in financial structure towards
equity would then imply a revenue gain of .j5lr (.021D) =180million
dollars .Weassume r =.063andD =-10billion dollars (as in
vonFurstenberg (1977)).In addition, capital will shift slightly
towards the corporate sector, where it is taxed more heavily. The
change in the excess burden of 39 million dollars is approximately
tAK,where tis the tax distortionand AK is the amount of
capital shifted to the corporate sector. Therefore, 39million
dollarsalso measures the increase in tax revenue resulting from
this shift in capital. Thus the net revenue loss would be about
123 million dollars, compared with a decrease in the excess burden
of 171 million dollars.
On net, there appear to be large efficiency gains from a cut
in the corporation tax rate, although there may also be some equity
costs. Larger
/changesin the corporate tax rate will notappear as favorable,
however, since the excess burden declines asthe square of the
existing distortion.
2.Increases in the capital gains tax rate
Advocates of a comprehensive income tax argue that an increase
inthe effective capital gains tax rate would be desirable on
equity grounds. What efficiency implications would such a change
have?
An increase in the capital gains tax would cause an increase
in debt-equity rates, increasing the excess burden created by a
levered financial structure. In Section III.A.2, we showed98.
that the excess burden was proportional to (1-(1-ab))2
63Here,
ab is a weighted averageof the values for each investor.
A uniform .01 increase in the effective tax rate c implies an
approximately one percent change in ab ,giventhat c is small.
This change in ab then implies a 6.6% increase in excess burden
costs, given our assumption that ab =.75,ora loss of 212 million dollars..
also
This one percent change in ab/ implies, according to
the 'triangular approximation to Figure 1, that D will increase by
This change, together with the change in ab, implies that
the cost of the investment distortion will increase by 2.1 or
by 27 million dollars.
Counter balancing these costs is the fact that the distortion
in the dividend payout decision is diminished. Unfortunately, itis
not clear whether this reduction in the distortion is an efficiency
gain or loss if we assume that dividends are used as a signal.
In addition the increase in the capital gains tax rate cuts
the size of the inefficiency in private risk bearing. Inspection
of the argument in Section III.B shows that these excess burden
costs will drop approximately two percent as a result of a one
percent rise in the capital gains rate. Nevertheless,such a rise
in capital gains taxes implies an efficiency gain of just .8 million
dollars. However, the amount of risk born by the government
increases, while costs of bearing this risk will be ignored bythe
firm in its investment decisions.
6we assume that the dividend payout rate readjusts so as
to maintain a=1 at the new equilibrium.99.
Iithe capital gains tax were maintained as a taxon realizations,
then there would be an additional cost resulting from thistax
increase due to an even stronger lock in effect in securities This is so because
hldings./ an investor can postpone payment of tax on his accuiiula ted
capital gainswithout penalty by postDoning the sal.e of the asset.
Increasingthe capital gains tax through including
andthus p3rtof corporate retained earnings in individualincome, /taxing
capital gains on accrual to the extent that retained earnings equal
capitalgains, is one procedure which would not have this extra
cost.
Anunexpected increase in c will make equity less attractive.
However, in equilibrium the returns from a dollar of real invest-
ment will continue to be worth a dollar on the stock market.Intra-
marginalholdings ofequity will drop in value, implying a loss in
utility for those with the strongest relative preference for equity.
In addition, existing bond holders will be worse off due to the
increased chance of default.
liowmuchrevenue will be raised by a .01 increase in the
effectivetax ratec?Ifthe stock market grows normally at 8Y°
a year on abaseof 630 billion (as reported in vonFurstenberg
(1977) for 1975), then the extra revenue, assuming no change
in b2havior, would be 50i million dollars. However, individuals
will tend Lo shift towards debt. Assuming the triangular
approximation in Figure 1, the amount of debt will increase by 33Yo
whenab = Ifthecombined tax rate100.
on equity exceeds that on debt by .31 (as argued above), then the
drop in revenue due to this shift towards debt would have been in
1975 .31r(.033D) =28million, assuming r =.063.In addition,
due to the rise in ab capital will flow to a degree to the non-
corporate sector. As noted before, the size of the revenue loss
due to this movement will approximately equal the efficiency loss,
which we measured to be 27 million dollars.The net revenue gain
would therefore be 193 million. This is to be compared with the
238 million increase in the excess burden, ignoring any effect on
dividends.
We should note, however, that achieving a .01 increase in
the effective tax rate c may not be easy. Increasing the statutory
rate might cause little increase in the effective rate due to further
constructive
postponement of realizations. It may be that / realizationat
death or partial taxation on accrual, however feasible, would be
necessary in order to raise the effective tax rate.
3. Partial deductibility of dividends under the corporate tax
It would seem that an alternative way to lower the tax
disincentive to equity finance would be to allow corporations to
deduct at least part of their dividends from their taxable income.
Let us assume only one percent of dividends is made deductible.
What efficiency and equity effects would this tax change have?
If the tax rate on dividends is lowered by this device, then the
amount of dividends and new issues of equity will increase until
again a=1 ,sothat dividends and retentions are valued equally,
and q=l .Thereis no necessity that ab change at all in this101.
process.If it does not, then the equilibriumdebt-equity ratio
does not change. Also, theequilibrium allocation of capital between
the corporate and noncorporate sectorswill not change. The tax
disincentives to dividends dropslightly due to this change.
However, by the arguments in Section III.C, it isnot clear whether
this is an efficiency gain or loss.
How much will tax revenues change asa result of this tax
change? If there were no change in dividendpayout rates, then
corporate revenues would drop by .01tDiv =1million dollars in
1975 when corporate dividends were 32.1 billion dollars.However,
shareholders will be taxed at anaverage marginal rate of .157
(accordingto Feldstein and Summers (1979) on thisincome, implying
an offsetting revenue gain of 2-- million dollars.In addition, the
dividend payout rate willpresumably increase in response to the tax
change. According to Feldstein and Summers (1979),. theaverage
personal marginal tax rate on dividends is higher than thaton
capital gains by .2t, while with this change, thecorporate rate
is lower by .oo5.6 Our only estimate of theresponsiveness of
dividends to the relative tax rate is in Feldstein(1970), based on
English data, where the elasticity of dividends to theopportunity
cost in retained earnings was .9. Under thisproposal, the
opportunity cost in retained earnings declines by .9/O, implying a
forecasted increase in dividends of .8'o.Taxrevenues would
then increase by (.235)(.o08)(32.1) =60million dollars in 1975,
when dividends were 32.1 billion dollars. This gives us a total
6Weignore here for lack of information the decrease in
corporate taxrevenues due to different relative tax rates on
dividends and capital gains forcorporate holdings of equity.102.
revenue loss of 70 million dollars. In contrast, there is no presumed
effect on efficiency, ignoring any effects on the dividend payout
rate or on savings decisions.
/
Arethere any important equity consideratiop.s raised by such
a change? We argued above that changes in the corporate tax structure
do not affect the equity of the tax system per se. However, an
increase in the dividend payout rate implies that a higher percent
of the return to corporate shares is taxed at ordinary rates, pushing
the tax treatment closer to that in a comprehensive income tax.
ii.Limiteddeductibility of interest payments under the
corporation tax
Ifthe tax on equity is high compared with that on debt,
another possible change to reduce this difference is to lower the
degree to which interest payments are deductible under the corporation
tax. Let us assume that one percent of such payments are no longer
deductible. What efficiency and equity effects would ensue?
If we rederive the expression in Section III.A.2 for marginal
excess burden costs from debt finance, we find that it now equals
(r(.r_(1-ab(1-.O1T))). When ab =.75, thedistortion drops by 1.6%,
and the excess burden by 97milliondollars. However, when we
reexamine the conditions for an equilibrium capital stock in the
corporate sector, we find that s_r increases by-due
tothe heavier taxation of debt financed capital. In addition, the
amount of debt will drop by 1.6%, using the triangular approximation
toFigure 1, causing V to drop. These changes cause a further shift
ofcapital to the noncorporate sector, increasing the cost of this
distortionby Ii.6%or by 52 million dollars.103.
How much revenue would be gained by this change? If the
market value of corporate debt isIiJ-0 billiondollars and the average
longterm interest rate is about .09, figures taken from1977,
then, with no change in behavior corporate tax revenues will increase
by 190 million dollars. Since corporate revenues drop by this
amount, tax payments by shareholders drop by 50 million dollars,
assuming their average marginal tax rate is .157.However,due to
the drop in the distortion favoring debt, the amount of debt will
drop. By our triangular approximation to Figure 1, the debt decreases
by 1.6U/o when ab =.75.If the tax rate on equity is .31 higher
thanthat on debt, then revenues increase by 137 million dollars.
However, the shift of capital from the corporate to the noncorporate
sectors causes a revenue loss comparable to the efficiency loss,
or about 52 million dollars. Thus, not only is there a total
revenue gain of 2115 million dollars, but, in addition,
efficiency costs drop by 7 million dollars.
Are there anyoffsettingequity costs? Since debt equity
ratios drop, somewhat more income will appear as capital gains,
making the tax system less equitable from the point of view of a
comprehensive incometax. In addition, the hi.ghar corp3rate taxes
may makethefirm se2m more risky to existing bondholders, resulting
ina capital loss for them. Of course we must also remind the reader
that we continue to ignore the resulting increase in the inefficiency
of savings decisions.
5. Partnership treatment of corporate income
So far, we have examined just marginal changes in the tax law.
A more comprehensive proposal would be to eliminate the corporate
income tax entirely and attribute all profits proportionate1y to
shareholders to be included intheir taxable income, taxable atlou.
ordinaryrates. This treatment would be equivalent to the treatment
ofpartnership income under the currentlaws. To the extent that
shareprices rose by an amount different from the proportional
share oi retained earnings, then the difference would he treated
as a capital gain and taxed accordingly. This proposalis
developed in great detail in McLure (1979). Whatefectswould
this proposal have?
To the extent that share prices do rise by the proportional
share of retained earnings, then all income derived from corporate
earnings, whether arising from bonds or equity, would be taxedat
ordinary rates, as required under a comprehensive income tax.
However, inspection of firm accounts suggests that capital gains
and retained earnings do differ substantially. in any case, a
much smaller share of the income from owning corporate shares ought
to take the form of capital gains, an improvement from the point
of view of a comprehensive income tax.
What efficiency gains would arise? Since the tax treatment
of income from debt and equity is identical under this proposal,
the tax distortion in financial policy would be eliminated,
implying a drop of 3.2 billion dollars in excess burden costs.
Also, there would no longer be a difference in the tax treatment
of corporate vs. noncorporate capital, implying that the 1.1
billion dollar distortion cost from the inefficient allocation
of capital would be eliminated. Since c =m,ignoringthe
deviation between capital gains and retained earnings, private105.
riskbearing will also be efficient,a gain of 1 million dollars
per year.6 In addition, the distortion in the dividend payout
decision would be eliminated. However, by the arguments in
Section III.C, it is not clear whether this is an efficiency gain
or loss, when dividends are used as a signal. However, savings
decisions may be further distorted, as those with high tax rates
find one relatively desirable asset (equity) less desirable.
To get a very crude revenue estir.ate, we continue to assume
that the average marginal tax rate on equity is .31abovethat on
bonds.Uider thisproposal, the tax rate on equity .i1l become just
eouelto that on bonds for those currently holding equity. In
addition, other individuals will shit from debt to dciuity, to
avoid bankruptcy costs, but this will have no taxconsequence.
Therefore,the revenue loss ought to beon the order of 3l of the
returnon corporate equity, or 23.-billiondollars in 1917,
asuoiing 630 billion in equity (as in von Furstenberg (1977))
and a before tax totalrate of return of l2'°. This is to be cornp3rad
6However, the risk bornby the governmeflt through its tax
revenues will increase, implying inefficiency in investment
decisions since the firm will ignore the costs to the government of bearing this risk.106.
with a ti-.3 billion dollar reduction in excess burden costs.
This figure, though, omits any efficiency effects of the change
in the size of the distortion affecting dividend payout and, more
importantly, savings decisions. Our discussion also ignores
possible difficulties in implementing such a proposal.
6. An expenditure tax
An alternative major change in the tax system would be to
eliminate any personal taxes on the return tosavings, whether from
anterest receiDts, dividends, or capital gains. Sucha tax has been
advocated onbothefficiency and equity grounds by a number of
economists. Its most important advantage isundoubtedly its
elimination of the distprtion in savings decisions createdby the
t3xatlonofthereturnsto savings, an aspect not developed in this
ccer.Let us axolore,however, what irnplicetionsthischangeweuld
have in the areas we have explored.
Optimal corporate financial policy implies, according to
SectionIII.A.2, that c(D/E) =r(T_(lh)).If an expenditure tax
.;ere imposed and the corporation tax repealed, -then this distortion
will disappear. However, if thecorporation tax were left in
place,and <1.0initially, then the distortion would
increaseby (l-ab)r. If =.75initially,we would extrapolate
theadditional excess burden costs to be 3.5 billion dollars. This
suggests that proposals for an expenditure tax, ifnot accompanied
bya repeal of the corporation tax, ought to be accompanied at
least by a reduction in the distortion favoring debt finance within
the corporate income tax.l0T.
If the corporate income tax were left inplace, then there
would also remain a distortion between investment incorporate
and noncorporate uses. Due to the increaseduse of debt finance
under this situation, the distortion might well besmaller than
itiscurrently. However, it would be eliminated entirely if the
corporate income tax were also eliminated.
Adoption of an expenditure tax would also imply an elimination
of the distortion in risk bearing. However, since theefficiency
costs here were only on the order of million dollars, this
effect is small in compsrison.
Thedistortion in the dividend payout decision would also he
eliminated under an expenditure tax. Whether this is on efficiency
gain or loss is unclear, however.
Further ar4alysis of an expenditure tax is beyond thescope of
this paper. However, it is clear that tax reformers mustworry
siriultarieouslv about the corporation tax when advocating a movement
towardsan expenditure tax.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, wehavedeveloped a model of corporate financial
deciscns whenthereis both uncertainty and the possibility of
Costly bankruotcy. Wethenused this model to measure tia nature
ofthe distortions in behavior induced by the existing tax structure,
and their excess burden ccsts. We finally explored the effects on
efficiency costs and revenues of various possible modifications
of existing taxes.
Our major conclusions are:
1) As long as firms are competitive, explicit incorporation of
bankruotcy costs is essential if a model is to explain the observed
fiirr'iflstrurture.108.
2)Debt-equity ratios historically increased steadilysince
World War II until l97, and have only declined slightlysince
then. We might infer from this rise an increasing optimism(or
decreasing pssimism) about future prospects until the early 1970's.
3) The efficiency costs arising from tax incentivesto increase
debt-equity ratios are substantial, being on the orderof 3
billion dollars a year, or approximately lO"/° of corporate
tax revenues.
)However,distortions in the allocation of capital between
corporate and noncorporate uses do not appear to be as largeas
previouslythought.In particular our estimate is one-quarter to
the size
one-third/of previous estimates.
5)As a result of the distortions affecting debt-equity decisions,
any of several directions of tax changeaimed at lessening the
distortion in debt-equity ratios would appear attractive.109.
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Glossary of Symbols
c implicit accruals tax rate on capital gains
c(D/E) icrease in annual bankruptcy costs resulting from an
increase in the firm's debt/equity ratio via replacement
of equity with debt.
CD increase in annual bankruptcy costs resulting from a
dollar of debt financed real investment
CE increase in annual bankruptcy costs resulting from a
dollar of equity financed real investment
rate of return on the ithsecurity through dividends,
taxable to the individual at ordinary rates
dM rate of return on the market portfolio through dividends,
taxable to the individual at ordinary rates
D. tax depreciation allowance per dollar of capital
Da actual replacement rate per dollar of capital
/
g yearly rate of growth of the capital stock
g return on the ith security taxable at capital gains rates
gM return on the market portfolio taxable at capital
gains rates
m marginal tax rate on interest income for an individual
n marginal tax rate on dividends for an individual
N number of shares of equity outstanding
p percent of a firm's after-tax profits paid out as dividends115.
q stock market value of the present value ofreturns
from a dollar of marginal real investment
r market interest rate on corporate bonds
rf market interest rate on tax-exempt bonds
r riskless market interest rate z
S pretaxmarginal return on capital (after depreciation
and expenses)
a relative value of a dollar of dividendscompared with
a dollar of capital gains in the stock market
crb relative value of a dollar of interest receiptscompared
with a dollar of capital gains in the stock market
riskiness of the ith security measured as
percent of debt finance used to finance new investments
stochasticelement, with mean zero, of the return on
a dollar real investment
before tax risk premium on the uncertain returns from
a dollar of real investment
corporate tax rateA-i.
APPENDIXA
Comparison of Taxable and Tax-Free Interest Rates
Inthis Apoenclix, we attemptto estimatethe relationship
between equivalent taxable and Lax-free long-term bonds and,
implicitly, the marginal tax rate of rnargina 1 buyers of taxable
i.sues. VTedo so by comparing the equilibrium yields of tw
securities of the s3mecorporate issuer: one taxable and one
tDXexept.If two securities are identical in all respects
except that of taxability ofinterest returns, we can write
the following ecuilibriurn relationship: Letting r andrf
standfor the taxable and tax-exempt yields of bonds of the same
quality, an investor will be indifferent between the two issues if
-' If
r(i—m)=r,thus, m 1 —
wherem is the marginal tax rate on bondinterest for the
investor. Since r and rf are assumed to be equilibrium yields
in the inrkct, then m must be the marginal tax rate of the
rorgiridiinvest.or. Allinvasors with higher marginal tax rates
willbe investing in tax-exemptbonds,while all investors in
lowerbrackets will buy taxable bonds. At the margin, the tax
bracket of the investor indifferent between the two securities
determines the equilibrium yields. That investor pays the
highest tax rate of all investors whoownthe taxablebond.
The usualdifficulty withsuchanexerciseis the difficulty
offindingccrrparable taxable andtax-freeissues.A-2.
Foutunately, it is possible to find a sample of several
corporateissuers who simultaneously sell tax-exempt and taxable
bonds.Inrecentperiods, corporations have often been able to
financepart ofthe exoc±nditure for a particular plant with tax-
exempt industrial revenue bonds. These bonds are issued by the
local municipality, but all debt service requirements ere the
responsibility of the corporation. Since the bond interest is
exempt rom oersonal income taxes, these bonds yield less than
equivalent taxable securities. Obviously,the firm would choose
to do all of its horroing with these types of securities, but
by the U.S. Treasury
thetotal arauntof each issueis limited/to 5,7OO,OOO. Thus,
firms will often finence a new plant with industrial revenue bonds
(up to the maximum1 ira it)and then finance the rerna indar with
raaulart:eble securities. This givesus a chanceto see how
corporate bo:ds are oriced inthemarket when they differ only
with respect to the tax status of the interest paid.
Duringl9, we couldfindsuch joint issues,wherethe
termsof two issues were sufficiently similar to rule out any
other influence On the yields of the bonds. The data are
presented in Table 1.The data suggest that rf =.775rand
that the tx bracket of the marginal investor, was approximately
22 1/2 percent in 1978.1-3.
Table 1
Simultaneous Taxable and Tax-Exempt Issues
Date Company Yields to Maturity rf!r
r r
Exel md 9.25 7.125 .770
L/2z/7B Carolina Frt. 9.875 7.50 •759
CarriersCorp.
7/25/78Haverty 10.0 7.75 .775
Furniture




socondmethod to estimate the tax bracket of themarginal
r.vestor intaxable (corporate) bonds is to compare the yields
of -oexb1eand tax-exempt issuesof thesame quality. Here we
carcdthe yields of taxable and tax-exempt long-term issues
ofecuivalent ratingduring calendar year 1978. Of course, this
cooerison controls less well for quality and other variations.
For example, an AA bond quality
/.ratingmay not implythe same/forthe two types of
securities. Moreover, while an attempt was made to control for
euiva1ence of call protection, it was simply not possibleto
ensure that the bonds compared were equivalent in all rcspects
evertheiess, the estimates obtained were similar to those
described above although they suggest a somewhat higher taxA -
bracketfor the marginal investor. During 1978 the ratio
rf/rgenerally ranged between .5and .70.
Finally,it is interesting to nate that J. liuston 1cCulloch
(l95)has prodiced esLirates for the tax bracketof the
marginalii:ves totintaxable go\ rr-ment bonds. NeCulloch's
methodolcjyis quite different- -he estimates marginal tax rates
by looking at ho.: yields differ on long-term governmentbonds
selling at par and at discounts. The formerbonds giveall of
t3eir promised yield in fully txable coupon payments whilethe
lattergive someof their yield in favorably taxed capital gains
(the difference between the market and redemption prices of the
bonds). NcCu].loch estimates the effective tax rate that best
explains the prices of U.S. Treasury securities lies somewhere
in the range .22 to .30implyinga range for rf,/r of .70 to .'8.
Takn; al tne eiserice into account arid givingspeclaiwaicjht
toour e5timatesbased on the issues in Table Al wherethe best
control was exercised over quality and terms of the two issues
cortioared,ce es.imaLe that iscooroximately equal to 3/
of r for long—term securities.
It should be noted, however, that these estimates apply only
to long-term bonds. It appears that the tax rate for the marginal
buyerofshcrt-terrt issues is considerably higher than 2 percent.
Comparingshort-term orim housing notes (the highest quality
government-guaranteed, tax-exempt security ave ilable) with U.S.
Treasury bills of comparable maturity over year-end periods from




Approximation of the Excess Burden From Inefficient
Risk-Bearing
In section III.B, we noted that the marginal risk premium
on a security for a given investor would be
g + - ---y rnax((l-m)r,rf)
This will vary systematically across investors
due to the variation in tax rates across investors.In this
appendix, we would like to approximate the efficiency gains from
redistributing risk among investors until all investors have the
same risk premium at the margin.
In order to do this, we first make the following simplifying
assumptions on relative magnitudes:
(1) c =.2m,(2) rf =.77r
,() d=.6r,(1.)g =r
With these assumptions, we can express an investor's risk premium
as a function of his a = .Thisrelationship is plotted in
Figure 2.
We now would like to estimate the total efficiency gains
resulting from a reallocation of risk across investors. In order
to approximate the order of magnitude of these efficiency gains,
let us make the following assumptions: i) the distribution of
investors (weighted by their equity portfolio) across values of a
is uniform between .35andi.o,66 and 2) each individual's risk
premium is proportional to his holdings of risky
66 the TAXSIMfile, the distribution of individual's
marginal tax rates is slightly heavier at the higher tax rates,
but introducing tax-free investors ought to at least offset
this.securities.
B-2.
Assumption 1, along with our earlier assumptions, then
implies that the distribution of the marginal risk premia assigned
to each share takes the simple form shown in Figure Bl.Taxpayers
witha va 1e of a greater than .68havea risk premia between
.60rand .68rwhile those with a value of a less than z z





Assumption 2, applied to Figure 3, impliesthat at the new
equilibrium when all individuals have the same risk premium,
67Thisassumptionessentially follows from the capital asset
Drict- model. To see this, let theindividual's utility function
be 2) where p, the mean return on the portfolio, equals r 'x a::-ere a2, the variance of the return onhisportfolio,
£clsx'2x. Herer is a vector of expected after tax returns
- availableassets, x is avector of the dollars invested
sa: security by the individual, and is a matrix of
ccarLnceS of after tax returns among the securities. Manipulation
of first-order conditions then gives
1 x= (r—ar), where r_crr represents the after tax risk
2
As asserted, x is proportional to the after tax risk





thiscommon risk premium will be .53r•68
y assumption 2,theefficiency gain when an individual trades
n initial risk premium of x to the market equilibrium
premium ofpisjust -x)(M)I,where AAmeasures
e difference inthenumber of securities the individual owns
Tcetwen the two equilibria --themarginal efficiency gain
c:inesfrom p-x to zero, givingan average of (P-x) per unit
c:—.ngein holdings. Also by assumption 2, wehave that
=- l)A,where A is the initial holdings. Combining
t:-se results and summing over individuals, we find that the
tc.talefficiency gainfrom spreading risk efficiently wcul be
.Cr .68r z .53r I .53r
VH.Lcz I-I(.icrz_x)(-__----l)dx+).79/(.53r-x)(—------ -l)c1x]
.6Or
=.0.0lrV,whereV is thetotal amount of risky securities
:ts tending.
Let represent the new equilibrium risk premium. Then
:-ust be thatthe number of securities that individuals with an
:il risk premium below p will buy will just equal the number ttthoseinitially above p willwant to sell.. ssurnption 2
iiies that if the initial risk premium were x, then the desired
c:-.-e inholdingswill be (,- i)A,where A is the amount of





. 60 -eretheamount of initial holdings is replaced by the density initialholdings. Simple algebra implies P.=.53r
-'Thisnumber is too large by about five percent since what
is being traded is risk in units equal to those in a share before
tx. yetthe government has absorbed about five percent of the
c::ginal risk through the capital gains tax.